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ABSTRACT 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon to the world, yet it remains difficult to define 
and to counter. Countering terrorism requires several measures that must be taken at the 
same time. Counterterrorism strategies of most countries depend on military measures. 
However, those strategies should also focus on nonlethal measures, such as economic, 
political, and social measures. The psychological dimensions of terrorism must be 
understood, evaluated, and used in countering terrorism. This study suggests that 
psychological operations, as nonlethal military operations, can be used to influence 
individuals not to join terrorist organizations and to facilitate defections from terrorist 
organizations.  
However, in order to implement effective psychological operations, one has to 
have appropriate intelligence about terrorist organizations. Examining terrorist 
organizations helps us to identify their vulnerabilities and obtain this intelligence. This 
thesis concludes that terrorists’ motivations, terrorist organizations’ radicalization, 
recruitment, and conversion processes, ideology, goals, strategies, and general structure 
form the intelligence requirement for psychological operations in counterterrorism. This 
study also examines the terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, to show its vulnerabilities. 
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A. IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE  
The first major terrorist attack against the United States was a suicide attack 
against the United States embassy in Beirut in April 1983, killing 63 people, including 17 
Americans. The first attack was not the last one. Terrorists have conducted more than 
twenty attacks against United States facilities all over the world. The 2001 terrorist attack 
on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center was the twenty-first major attack 
conducted by terrorists. In the aftermath of this attack, the United States started and has 
led the campaign of Global War on Terrorism. They have invaded Afghanistan and Iraq 
and have encountered insurgencies run by terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates. The insurgencies have increased in effectiveness over the years. The United 
States, though, has made significant improvements in disrupting and destroying terrorist 
organizations’ activities. The destruction of al-Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, the 
elimination of many group leaders, and the growing resolve of many countries to take 
action against al-Qaeda and it associates are the significant successes of the United 
States’ strategy of counterterrorism. However, terrorist organizations have adopted new 
methods in order to radicalize and recruit new members and have conducted attacks 
against the United States forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have taken 
advantage of the information age. Terrorist organizations have successfully conveyed to 
and imposed their ideologies upon populations, by whom they have been supported. 
Although the United States has the most trained and equipped security and intelligence 
agencies in the world, the attacks could still not be prevented by the United States.  
The same situation is relevant for other countries, which have problems with 
terrorist organizations. Turkey is one of those countries, which has been suffering from 
direct and indirect effects of terrorism. Turkey has been fighting against the terrorist 




and KGK) for more than thirty years and has lost more than 30,000 citizens and security 
forces during these years. Although Turkey also has powerful armed forces, they have 
difficulty in deterring terrorists from conducting attacks.  
The cases of terrorism have proved that military sanctions alone are not adequate 
or efficient in destroying terrorism. In order to counter terrorism, the psychological 
dimensions of the war must be understood and evaluated. The nature of terrorist 
organizations and individual terrorists, such as their motivations, beliefs, and ideologies, 
have to be completely understood and the connection between terrorist organizations and 
the population, by whom they are supported, must be defined and severed. The 
vulnerabilities, which can be obtained from an analysis of their nature and connection, 
have to be understood in order to degrade terrorists’ morale and motivation. By 
exploiting these vulnerabilities, terrorists can be deterred from conducting terrorist 
activities.  
Therefore, with the employment of political, social, and economic sanctions, 
psychological operations should be considered a fundamental aspect of any military 
campaign to deter terrorists and sever the support of the population for terrorists.   
Psychological operations, as defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05-301, are 
“planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign target 
audiences (TAs) to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.”1 
If psychological operations are properly employed, the motivation and combat efficiency 
of an enemy will decrease and dissidence and disaffection will be caused within the 
enemies’ ranks. Psychological operations may also promote resistance within a civilian 
populace against a hostile regime or a terrorist organization. Therefore, psychological 
operations can be used to deter terrorists, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations’ 
activities, and influence the population to sever the support given to the terrorist 
organizations.  
                                                 
1 United States Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003), 439. 
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However, psychological operations performed as military operations must be 
conducted appropriately to provide optimal effect on the target audience. Disseminating 
an improper message to terrorists and a population, with a lack of accurate information, 
may cause undesirable retaliation against allied forces on the ground. Furthermore, the 
support of the population for the terrorist organizations may increase as an outcome of 
this improper message.      
In order to compose a correct message and disseminate the message to the correct 
target audience, one needs reliable and useful intelligence about the enemy. In 
psychological operations, a unique approach to intelligence is required since conventional 
intelligence is different from intelligence needed in psychological operations. 
Psychological operations require familiarity with the culture of the target audience, the 
ability to speak the language, and the ability to bridge between one’s own culture and that 
of the target audience. In short, this type of intelligence requires an understanding of 
anthropology, psychology, and political science.2 When considering terrorism and 
terrorist organizations, the required intelligence is also different from that used in 
psychological operations and is difficult to collect. Terrorist organizations do not possess 
the exact basic characteristics of a target audience. Terrorists are embedded in the 
population in which they live and cannot be detected unless they are separated from that 
population. Terrorists have their own beliefs, emotions, and motivations. Therefore, 
intelligence services and other units must provide accurate and exact intelligence about 
culture and motivation, and a concise psychology of terrorists, which can be used in 
psychological operations against them. Moreover, in order to cut the support of the 
population, cultural intelligence of terrorist organizations must be accurate. 
In conclusion, in order to be successful in the war against terrorists, psychological 
operations must be considered along with other military tools in order to deter terrorists, 
disrupt terrorists’ activities, and sever support given by a population. Implementing 
effective psychological operations requires accurate intelligence about vulnerabilities of 
                                                 
2 Ron Schleifer, Table of Contents, in Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian 
Media Politics and Military Strategies (Brighton; Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 241, 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0614/2006017721.html (accessed December 2, 2008).  
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terrorist organizations, which can be obtained from the analysis of terrorists’ motivations 
and psychology. Moreover, intelligence necessary in psychological operations is different 
from conventional intelligence and it is about the culture of terrorist organizations and the 
populations with which they work.  
In this context, this thesis will identify the intelligence requirements for 
psychological operations in counterterrorism operations. This thesis seeks to determine 
the characteristics of terrorist organizations in order to find their vulnerabilities. With 
knowledge of those vulnerabilities, officials can implement effective psychological 
operations against the foot soldier cadre and the individuals, who are inclined to be 
radicalized and recruited because of their beliefs. In this regard, terrorism and the 
characteristics of terrorist organizations will be discussed as a basis for implementing 
effective psychological operations to counter terrorism. 
B. BACKGROUND 
After the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States encountered 
insurgencies organized by terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and its associates. The 
increasing support by the Iraqi and Afghan populations for the insurgencies has signaled 
that terrorist activities cannot be defeated by normal military operations. An indirect 
approach must be considered. First, the support given by the population to terrorists must 
be severed by using psychological operations with the employment of other military 
actions and political, social, and economic sanctions. Second, psychological operations 
against terrorist organizations’ members have to be conducted in order to deter terrorists. 
As an example, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines shows an indirect 
approach to sever population support for the insurgency through use of psychological 
operations. In February 2002, the United States dispatched a unit composed of 1,300 U.S. 
troops to the southern Philippines. Its mission was to conduct unconventional warfare 
operations by, with, and through indigenous forces to help the government separate the 
population from, and then destroy, Abu Sayyaf, an al-Qaeda-linked group. Using their 
language and cultural skills, the teams quickly formed a bond with local villagers to  
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provide a secure environment. Once security was provided, humanitarian assistance and 
civic action projects were implemented. Additionally, psychological operations were 
conducted to highlight the negative effects of terrorism.3  
Though leaders of terrorist organizations cannot be easily deterred, since they are 
radicalized, the foot soldiers of terrorist organizations, who do not have strong 
ideological beliefs, can be deterred. Since they are not fully radicalized and they may 
have many things that they hold dear, they are subject to manipulation. It is known that 
Israel has deterred many terrorists. By using terrorists’ families as a deterrence asset, 
Israel has prevented many suicide attacks against military forces.4 Strategies that have an 
embedded psychological dimension can deter terrorists. 
In conclusion, it could be said that psychological operations have been used to 
influence individuals in order to produce desired behaviors from them. These strategies 
and tactics can also be used for terrorist organizations. Implementation of effective 
psychological operations may deter some terrorists from conducting attacks and also 
prevent individuals from joining terrorist organizations.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
Psychological operations can be used to counter terrorism by deterring terrorists 
and disrupting their activities. Moreover, with employment of psychological operations, 
populations can be influenced and persuaded to sever their support for terrorists. For this 
research, several questions must be addressed: 
• What is terrorism?  
• What are the beliefs, motivations, and vulnerabilities of terrorists?  
• Which methods do they use to convince foot soldiers to conduct attacks?  
• Can terrorist organizations be examined as a system?  
• What is psychological warfare?  
                                                 
3 Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-PHILIPPINES and the Indirect 
Approach,” Military Review 86, no. 6 (November/December 2006): 2. 
4 Doron Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism,” Parameters 34 no. 4 (Winter 
2004/2005): 15. 
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• How are psychological operations implemented?  
• What kind of measures of effectiveness can be developed to gauge the 
effectiveness of psychological operations?  
• What kind of intelligence is required in order to plan and execute effective 
psychological operations to counter terrorism?  
In order to answer these questions, this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II 
begins with a definition of terrorism. It will also be shown that there is no universally 
accepted definition of terrorism. The reasons for terrorism will be discussed. A terrorist 
profile will be developed by uncovering ideologies of terrorists. Terrorist organizations 
will be examined as a system in order to identify vulnerabilities to counter terrorism. 
Finally, psychological operations will be briefly examined to determine their utility for 
counterterrorism. 
Chapter III will discuss psychological operations in detail. In order to influence 
terrorists and supporters of terrorist organizations, influence techniques will be examined. 
The psychological dimensions of conflict will be reviewed. Levels of psychological 
operations will be defined. In the end, the intelligence requirements of psychological 
operations will be established. 
Chapter IV begins with the definition of intelligence and the various types of 
intelligence. Particular attention will be paid to the importance of intelligence and the 
difference between operational and psychological operations intelligence requirements. 
In terms of influencing individuals not to join terrorist organizations, cultural intelligence 
will be discussed. In the end, the intelligence requirements for conducting psychological 
operations will be identified.  
Al-Qaeda is a transnational terrorist organization which must be disrupted and 
destroyed. Chapter V will analyze al-Qaeda in terms of psychological operations for 
countering it. This chapter will discuss al-Qaeda’s ideology, strategy, member 
motivation, radicalization and recruitment processes, and organizational structure. 
Furthermore, the chapter will provide the author’s point of view on the steps that have to 
be taken by world officials in order to prevent continuous recruitment and radicalization 
of peaceful populations by al-Qaeda and to deter its current members.  
Chapter VI will contain the conclusion remarks of this thesis.  
 7
II. TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Some Hindus had brought an elephant for exhibition and placed it in a 
dark house. Crowds of people were going into that dark place to see the 
beast. Finding that ocular inspection was impossible, each visitor felt it 
with his palm in the darkness. The palm of one fell on the trunk ‘This 
creature is like a water-spout,’ he said. The hand of another lighted on the 
elephant’s ear. To him the beast was evidently like a fan. Another rubbed 
against its leg. ‘I found the elephant’s shape is like a pillar,’ he said. 
Another laid his hand on its back. ‘Certainly this elephant was like a 
throne,’ he said.5 
      Rumi 1207-1273 
The terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon put terrorism in our daily life. Security inspections in airports and discussions 
about terrorism are examples of this infiltration. People around the world—in busses, on 
trains, and in shopping malls—became the potential victims of terrorist bombings.  
Scholars all around the world have been trying to develop an exact and accepted 
definition of terrorism. However, since terrorism can be regarded as the elephant in the 
dark, there is no exact definition. Countries perceive and know terrorism according to 
their own contact with it, as in the elephant example. Although they see the same act, 
they interpret it according to their own experiences and prejudices. Therefore, one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. This chapter introduces the reader to terrorism 
and counterterrorism, describing these terms and examining the difficulty in defining 
what exactly terrorism is and the subsequent difficulty in countering it. The chapter also 
underlines the importance of recruitment prevention in order to undermine terrorist 
organizations. Finally, this chapter concludes with the idea that the use of psychological  
 
 
                                                 
5 Jalal al-Din Rumi, “Tales from Masnavi,” A. J. Arberry, trans., 
http://www.khamush.com/tales_from_masnavi.htm#The%20Elephant (accessed October 5, 2008). 
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operations to influence population not to join terrorist organizations and deter foot 
soldiers of terrorist organizations from conducting attacks is essential for 
counterterrorism.  
B. DEFINING TERRORISM 
Terrorism has always been hard to define. There are many different definitions of 
terrorism. Some scholars describe it as “the use of force or violence by individuals or 
groups that is directed toward civilian populations and intended to instill fear as a means 
of coercing individuals or groups to change their political and social positions.”6  
The U.S. State Department uses the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 
of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience,”7 while the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against a 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”8 The U.S. Department of 
Defense also defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of—or threatened use of—force or 
violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, 
often to achieve political or ideological objectives.”9 
Article 1 of the 1991 Anti-Terror Law of Turkey defines terrorism as: “any act 
committed by an individual or individuals belonging to an organization with a view to 
change the constitutionally determined characteristics of the Republic and the political, 
legal, social, secular, and economic order through oppression, violence, intimidation, or 
threat; to destroy the indivisible territorial and national integrity of the State or to 
                                                 
6 G. I. Wilson, Terrorism: Psychology and Kinetics, 6, http://www.d-n-
i.net/fcs/pdf/wilson_psychology_of_terrorism.pdf (accessed December 2, 2008). 
7 United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10220.htm (accessed August 14, 2008). 
8 “Terrorist group” is not defined. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 
1999, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf (accessed December 2, 2008). 
9 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, (2002), 437. 
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endanger the existence of the Turkish State and Republic; to weaken or take over the 
state authority; to suppress the fundamental rights and freedoms; to disrupt the domestic 
or external security as well as public order and health; is an act of terror.”10 
Alex P. Schmid cites 109 definitions of terrorism, in order to show the difficulty 
in determining a common definition in his book, Political Terrorism. He also lists the 




Violence, force 83.5 
Political  65 
Threat  51 
(Psych) effects and (anticipated) reactions  41.5 
Method of combat, strategy, tactic  30.5 
Extra normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian 
constraints 
30 
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance  28 
Publicity aspect 21.5 
Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination 21 
Civilians, noncombatants, neutral, outsiders as victims 17.5 
Intimidation 17 
Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5 
Group, movement, organization as perpetrator 14 
Symbolic aspect, demonstrators to others 13.5 
Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence 9 
Clandestine, covert nature 9 
Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence 7 
Criminal 6 
Demands made on third parties 4 




                                                 
10 “Anti-Terror Law No 3713,” Official Gazette, 30 no. 20843 (April 12, 1991), in Beril Dedeoglu, 
“Bermuda Triangle: Comparing Official Definitions of Terrorist Activity,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 15 (2004): 100. 
11 Alex P. Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Databases, Theories, & Literature (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 36. 
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By using these definitional elements, he proposes a broad definition of terrorism: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-)clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to 
assassination—the direct targets of violence are generally chosen 
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message 
generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between 
the terrorist (organization), the (imperiled) victims, and main targets are 
used to manipulate the main target (audiences), turning them into a target 
of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, 
coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.12 
All of these definitions show us that every country or individual defines terrorism 
according to their own unique concerns. These definitions demonstrate how people 
perceive terrorism and what measures they should apply to counter it. 
C. WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST? THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
TERRORISM  
A terrorist is an individual who chooses terrorism as a means to accomplish 
his/her ends. In order to understand why people employ terrorism or join terrorist 
organizations, authorities must comprehend the psychology behind terrorism. There is not 
an exact profile of a terrorist. Every individual or terrorist organization has its own 
motivations, ideologies, and causes to join terrorist organizations and employ terrorism.  
In the literature, misconception about terrorists is a frequent mistake made by 
academics. Even though poverty is accepted as one of the most popular explanations of 
terrorism, Mark Sageman claims that the vast majority of terrorists come from the middle 
class, which proves that poverty is not the major cause of terrorism. In his book, 
Leaderless Jihad, he clarifies other misconceptions about the accepted profile of a 
terrorist. He attests that they are not brainwashed by their religion, families, or cultures; 
they are not immature and ignorant; they have families and job responsibilities— 
                                                 
12 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: a New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, 
Theories, & Literature, 39. 
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contrary to what is believed.13 These misconceptions prove that terrorists and terrorist 
organizations may have different motivations, ideologies, and beliefs, which make them 
difficult to comprehend. Although it differs from one individual to another, there are 
some common characteristics of individuals who join terrorist organizations. 
1. Motivations of Terrorists 
Some scholars argue that a person who is frustrated by the gap between the 
expectations of his needs being met and the satisfaction of his needs actually being met 
might lead to aggression.14 Even though empirical evidence does not support this 
argument, the “frustration-aggression” model has been used to explain the reasons for 
terrorist actions for decades.15 Some scholars argue that some individuals need a 
scapegoat “to blame for their own inadequacies and weaknesses;”16 hence, those 
individuals who could be defined as mentally ill might define their environment as “us” 
and “them.”17 Eventually, in the literature, there are several approaches and theories 
which try to explain what leads individuals to violence. However, some common 
motivations could be found in terrorists’ profiles. 
The motives behind terrorism could be another aspect to be defined in order to 
understand the psychology of terrorism. Motive can be defined as “an emotion, desire, 
physiological need, or similar impulse that acts as an incitement to action.”18 One’s 
motivation for engaging in terrorism is often presumed to be the cause of the group and 
this motivation can change over time according to the objectives of the group. Many  
 
 
                                                 
13 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 200.  
14 Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and 
Why?” The Library of Congress (Washington, D.C. September, 1999), 19. 
15 Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa, University of South Florida, 2004), 12. 
16 Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” 20-
21. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 24. 
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academics argue that terrorism may have more than one incentive, including 
psychological, economic, political, religious, and sociological motivations,19 and these 
incentives may intertwine.  
As psychological incentives, Martha Crenshaw suggests that there are at least four 
categories of motivation among terrorists: (1) the opportunity for action, (2) the need to 
belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) the acquisition of material reward.20 
Injustice, identity, and belonging could be perceived as main themes in terms of 
motivation of terrorists.21 Moreover, it is argued that abuse in early childhood life could 
be one of the common themes accepted as a cause for individuals who apply violence.22 
Those themes also relate to one’s potential openness or vulnerability to join terrorist 
organizations. Firstly, injustice is a cause for terrorism, since the common response to a 
grievance could be an aggression; secondly, becoming a part of a group and adopting 
their incentives and goals as if they were one’s own, could be used to validate one’s 
psychological identity; finally, perceiving a group as one’s family could satisfy one of the 
individuals’ psychological needs, namely, the need of belonging to an entity.  
Furthermore, terrorism could be seen as a means to solve political and 
sociological disputes, such as “ethnic conflicts, religious and ideological conflicts, 
poverty, modernization stresses, political inequities, lack of peaceful communications 
channels, traditions of violence, the existence of a revolutionary group, governmental 
weakness and ineptness, erosions of confidence in regime, and deep divisions within 
governing elites and leadership groups.”23 In addition, it is argued that “lack of economic 
opportunity and recessionary economies are positively related to terrorism.”24  
                                                 
19 Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” 15. 
20 Martha Crenshaw, An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism Orbis, 29 no. 
3 (1985): 465-489.  
21 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 24. 
22 Ibid., 18. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “The Quality of Terror,” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3, 
(July 2005): 515. 
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2. Ideology of Terrorists 
Another dimension, which could be argued as a cause for some individuals to use 
terrorism as a weapon and as an incentive for their justification, is ideology.  Ideology 
could be seen as a tool by individuals to establish linkage between their actions and their 
justification.25 Moreover, ideology could provide terrorists with a standing point for their 
violent actions; in addition, ideology could give the terrorist objectives to be achieved; 
and finally, ideology could regulate terrorist organizations’ behaviors to maintain 
consistency in terms of uniformity of actions and arguments of organization.26 
Eventually, ideology could be used as a clarification to organize the group in terms of 
establishing a bridge between ends and means. 
Other than ideology, terrorists use some techniques to justify their violent actions 
such as “outside-in” and “inside-out” effects.27 One of the outside-in effects is perceiving 
oneself as waging war against a common ‘evil’; another is blaming the leader or the 
terrorist group itself to displace the responsibility.28 Furthermore, there are “inside-out 
effects that refer to blame victims, disregard the negative ramifications of their actions, 
and dehumanize victims.”29 Consequently, terrorists use some techniques both to 
mitigate the ramifications of their actions and to justify them. 
3. Goals and Strategies of Terrorist Organizations 
Effective counterstrategies require an understanding of the strategic logic that 
drives terrorist violence. Terrorism works not only because it causes governments and 
individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists’ cause, but simply because it instills 
fear in target populations. Although the ultimate goals of terrorists or organizations have 
varied over time, there are five general types of goals defined by scholars in the literature. 
These types of goals are regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, 
                                                 
25 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 28. 
26 Ibid., 47. 
27 Ibid., 48. 
28 Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” 39. 
29 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 51. 
 14
and status quo maintenance. Regime change is the overthrow of a government and the 
replacement of a government with one led by the terrorists—or at least one more to their 
liking. Territorial change is taking territory away from a state to establish a new state or 
to join another state. Policy change refers to a broader category of lesser demands. Status 
quo maintenance is the support of an existing regime or territorial arrangement against 
political groups that seek to change it. Finally, social control means the control over the 
behavior of individuals, rather than the state.30  
As discussed by H. Richard Yarger, for a state, strategy is all about how (way or 
concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to 
exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve 
objectives (ends) that support state interests.31 Terrorist organizations also have strategies 
in order to achieve their ultimate goals (discussed above). There are five strategies used 
by terrorist organizations in order to influence and persuade their enemy: (1) attrition, (2) 
intimidation, (3) provocation, (4) spoiling, and (5) outbidding. 
Attrition refers to the strategy which persuades an enemy that the terrorists are 
strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy follows a particular policy. 
Intimidation consists of sending messages that the terrorists are strong enough to punish 
disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so that people behave as 
the terrorists wish them to behave. Provocation refers to the attempt to induce the 
government to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which causes the 
population to be radicalized and support terrorists. In the strategy of spoiling, terrorists 
show the state as weak, untrustworthy, and the one who undermines attempts to reach a 
peace settlement. Finally, the outbidding strategy aims to persuade the public by violence 
that terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than do rival groups; therefore, they  
 
 
                                                 
30 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, International Security 31, no. 
1 (Summer 2006): 52.  
31 Yarger, Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model, 2.  
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are worthy of support.32 Understanding these five distinct strategic logics is crucial not 
only for comprehending terrorism but also for designing effective counterterrorism 
policies.  
D. HOW DO INDIVIDUALS BECOME TERRORISTS? THE 
RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT PROCESSES  
Terrorist recruitment is a crucial factor for terrorist organizations to survive. 
Without recruiting new members from the population, terrorist organizations do not have 
the ability to conduct attacks, which are essential to their survival, and over time, they 
may disappear. However, individuals do not join terrorist organizations. They 
intentionally are exposed to a radicalization process by terrorist organizations in order to 
recruit them.     
1. Radicalization Process 
The process of radicalization could have more than one motive. These 
motivations can be considered the beginning of radicalization process. The first group of 
people who join a terrorist organization could be unemployed and ones ousted from their 
societies. The second group could be adventure-seeking individuals. The third group 
comprises of more educated people, who perceive some specific political grievances as a 
valid incentive. The final group could be motivated by intellectual and ideological 
reasons, such as religion, regime change, and nationalism.33 Some scholars argue, “the 
process begins by framing some unsatisfying event or condition as being just. The 
injustice is blamed on a target policy, person, or a nation. The responsible party, 
perceived as a threat, is then vilified—often demonized—which facilitates justification 
for aggression.”34 Eventually, there is logic behind the pathway of radicalization, which 
leads to violence. 
                                                 
32 Kydd and Walter, The strategies of Terrorism, 51. 
33 Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” 24. 
34 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 28. 
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Social and operational observations of numerous terrorist and extremist groups 
showed that becoming a terrorist or recruitment process is not a discrete choice to change 
status. Horgan and Taylor argue that most involvement in terrorism results from gradual 
exposure and socialization towards extreme behavior.35 Mark Sageman also argues that 
joining a terrorist organization requires subsequent stages of radicalization.36 Therefore, 
it could be concluded that individuals do not instantly become terrorists; rather, there are 
some processes and/or pathways, which lead individuals to become radicalized and join a 
terrorist organization. 
Psychologist Eric D. Shaw provides a model that he calls “The Personal Pathway 
Model,” through which terrorists become radicalized and enter their new profession. The 
pathway comprises many stages such as “socialization processes; narcissistic injuries; 
escalatory events, particularly confrontation with police; and personal connections to 
terrorist group members.”37 He suggests that terrorists come from a selected population 
who suffered from damage to their self-esteem in early life stages. Although their 
political views and activities may be consistent with the “liberal social philosophies” of 
their families, they sometimes are moved beyond beliefs to social action. Terrorists are 
sensitized because of the economic and political tensions throughout modern society.38 
Moreover, the acts of law enforcement forces provoke these people to join a group as a 
psychosocial identity. In the end, they become radicalized and join terrorist organizations.  
Although the radicalization process may change according to different terrorist 
organizations, there are many similar points in the radicalization process. In the religious 
radicalization process, Mark Sageman notes that the expatriate individuals generally are 
inclined to join terrorist organizations since they feel alienated from the population in 
which they live. Another point is that the global Islamist terrorism social movement is 
based to a great degree on friendship and kinship. The friendship process includes two 
                                                 
35 J. Horgan and M. Taylor, The Making of a Terrorist, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13 no. 12 (2001): 
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36 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, 25-45.  
37 Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” 24.  
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aspects: the first one is the collective decision of a group to join a terrorist organization 
and the second one is to join one’s childhood friends who have already joined terrorist 
organizations. He describes the radicalization process within four stages: the moral 
outrage of individuals, which refers to the strong motivational effects of hearing about or 
watching suffering fellow Muslims; the moral universe, which refers to the idea that there 
is a war against Islam in the world; resonance with the personal experiences; and the 
mobilization by a network, which refers to guidance of terrorist organizations.39   
This radicalization process may also be relevant for other terrorist organizations 
such as Hamas, the PKK, and other national, secular terrorist organizations, since 
individuals from strict Islamic backgrounds were more likely to join Islamist groups, 
while those with no religious background might join either a secular or a religious group. 
For instance, the PKK members are also exposed to a similar process by the PKK.  The 
PKK provides most of its recruitment by using social settings, kinship, and friendship in 
the Turkish population.   
2. Recruitment Processes 
In order to defeat an enemy, it is very important to broadly analyze and 
understand your enemy. Furthermore, it could be crucial to know what resources the 
enemy uses, how those resources are obtained, and which strategies, tactics, and 
techniques are used to obtain these resources. If a country succeeds in interrupting the 
flow of resources into the enemy organization, it will probably be successful in defeating 
its enemy. Therefore, learning terrorist organizations’ methods of recruiting new 
members is also a significant step for destroying terrorist organizations. 
Before explaining recruitment processes used by terrorist organizations, it must be 
emphasized that the recruitment process is the stage immediately following the 
radicalization process. Radicalization is the mental prerequisite to recruitment. Brian 
Michael Jenkins asserts that while radicalization includes “internalizing a set of beliefs, a 
militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of one’s conviction,” 
                                                 
39 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, 200.  
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recruitment is turning others or transforming oneself into a weapon of a terrorist 
organization. In short, recruitment means going operational.40 However, it could be 
argued that in the recruitment process, individuals also continue to be radicalized because 
they are imposed or propagated with ideology of the terrorist organization.   
Terrorist organizations use different recruitment processes. The specific 
characterization of any recruitment process may be referred to as its shape. The shape is a 
combination of the overall recruitment pattern and specific descriptors. In order to 
counter recruitment, interventions should be matched to patterns and descriptors. 
Although there are a great variety of recruitment processes that might be used by terrorist 
organizations, a review of literature reveals a few common structures. Ultimately, there 
are four approaches used by terrorist organizations to disseminate their messages to 
targeted populations, namely the net approach, the funnel approach, the infection 
approach, and the seed crystal approach.41 
In the net approach, a terrorist organization targets the whole community equally. 
Since the community is considered to be homogenous and receptive enough to be 
approached, the messages are delivered individually to every member of the community 
by the recruiter. While some members respond positively and others may respond 
negatively, the whole population is viewed as ready for recruitment. This approach is 
used when there is little serious opposition in the community. Among the key variables to 
be investigated in this approach are the geography (Where is the net cast?) and 
demographic-psychographic similarities and contrast among the targeted population. 
(Who is caught? Who slips out of the net?)42 
If the targeted community is ripe for recruitment but needs transformation in 
identity and motivation, the funnel approach is employed by terrorist organizations. This 
approach is required to use an incremental pattern in order to recruit members of the 
                                                 
40 Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, 
Rand Document, April 5, 2007, 2.  
41 Scott Gerwehr, and Sara Daly, Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment, RAND document, 
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42 Ibid. 
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population. Potential recruits start the process at one side and are transformed into 
dedicated group members when they emerge at the other side of the funnel. Hazing 
rituals and group identity-building exercises are the significant characteristics of this 
approach. The funnel approach requires a broad knowledge of cognitive, social and 
clinical psychology in order to implement the process.43 
If the population in the target is so limited in accepting foreign ideas, the infection 
approach is used for recruitment. An agent can be inserted into the targeted community to 
rally potential recruits. In the early stages of this approach, this method of recruiting suits 
groups that are actively opposed by government, lending itself to secrecy and operational 
security. As recruits rally, the effort for recruiting grows. The significant variable that 
must be considered in this type of recruitment is time. The infection approach is likely to 
be the most suitable approach for a terrorist organization which tries to influence a police 
or military organization.44 
Generally, in the seed crystal approach, a targeted population is so inaccessible 
that a trusted agent cannot be inserted into the population. However, in this case, 
recruiters may seek to provide a context for self-recruitment. In self-recruitment process, 
individuals are influenced by incidents around him. Individuals get the basic motivation 
for joining terrorist organization. Once an individual emerges in the population as a new 
recruit, terrorist organizations begin to follow the infection approach. How long 
environmental manipulation must be applied in order to produce self-recruitment has a 
significant role in this approach. The seed crystal approach may be the most successful in 
populations where open recruiting is difficult or impossible.45  
As indicated above, terrorist organizations use these approaches in order to 
broadcast their message into the population. To spread their message, they use some 
persuasive instruments, which can be analyzed in two categories: direct and indirect 
instruments.46 While direct instruments consist of face-to-face invitations, indirect 
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44 Ibid., 78. 
45 Ibid., 79. 
46 Ibid., 80. 
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instruments include political pronouncements posted in a mosque, by media, or on a web 
site. Terrorist organizations make use of sermons, rumors, education, and training 
sessions in mosques and camps for direct interactions with recruits. They also make use 
of mass media such as newspapers, radio, television, and the web to spread their ideology 
for indirect interactions.  
These instruments are used accordingly with the aforementioned approaches. 
While direct and indirect instruments can be used together in the net approach, terrorist 
organizations must use indirect instruments in the early stages of the seed crystal 
approach in order to protect themselves from subversion in the country. On the other 
hand, direct instruments may be more useful in the funnel and infection approaches than 
in the net approach.  
Group psychology is another key aspect for recruitment of individuals to terrorist 
organizations. An individual’s transformation into a terrorist takes place within the 
structure of the terrorist group with a political or religious agenda. Within this group, 
terrorists get the feeling of self-importance, a sense of belonging, and a new belief 
system, which make them believe that terrorist acts are acceptable and that the group’s 
goals are important. After getting into the group, individuals are required to make some 
commitments to Scott Gerwehr, Sara Daly, Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Selection and 
Recruitment, rove their faith, devotion, and obedience. In time, individuals must make 
some commitment though actions in order to satisfy other group members and stay inside 
the group. In the end, the individual becomes a member of the terrorist organization.  
3. The Internet  
One of the significant indirect instruments used by terrorist organizations is the 
Internet. Use of the Internet has varied over time. Although every terrorist organization 
uses the Internet for different purposes, there are many similarities among these uses. 
Almost every terrorist organization uses the Internet for these purposes: “as a force-
multiplier in facilitating, shaping, and disseminating political propaganda (and 
‘uncensored’ disinformation campaigns and decoy sites); in recruitment (tapping into a 
broad sympathizer base far beyond their natural ethnic or religious constituency); 
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financing; in facilitating and controlling intra- and inter-group communication and 
coordination; information and intelligence gathering; stealth and anonymity in both 
routine activity and tactical operations; and ease of operations that are ‘cost-effective’ 
both in terms of resources expended and as a ‘force-multiplier’ in their ability to strike 
worldwide.”47  
The Internet has become one of the key elements in radicalization and recruitment 
of members. Individuals, who are exposed to suffering scenes of their fellows, become 
radicalized; and then they are recruited by terrorist organizations via message boards on 
the Internet. The volunteer and recruiter meet at the message board on the Internet. The 
volunteer then is subjected to a confidence exam. Passing the exam results in getting 
accepted into the terrorist organization. As an example, a message was posted by a 
jihadist on a website looking for volunteers for a jihad on March 17, 2005. The message 
also contained the skill list in order to be a mujahedeen fighter: loyalty, explosives 
expertise, and intelligence information. In addition, the terrorist invited people “who 
know how to draw up [sketch] plans,” for the jihad and wants them to “send [him] a map 
of [their] town in a special [private] message and give the places where the Americans, 
the Israelis, the Jews, or the Christians are located.”48 
E. COUNTERTERRORISM 
Terrorism is a tool or method for terrorists in order to attain their political, social 
demands and reach their ultimate goals. As discussed above, terrorists have different 
kinds of motivations, beliefs, and ideologies; likewise, terrorist organizations have 
different radicalization and recruitment processes. Therefore, it may be argued that 
counterterrorism cannot be a single policy, but must have several elements. In order to  
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understand terrorist organizations and build effective counter-strategies to prevent 
attacks, or at least reduce the frequency and severity of terrorism, one should examine 
terrorist organizations as an open system.  
1. Open System Theory 
Open System Theory was first proposed under the name “General System 
Theory” by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. However, Daniel Katz and Robert 
Kahn were the ones who first introduced it as “Open System Theory” in their seminal 
work, the Social Psychology of Organizations. Hitherto, the open system theory has been 
used for old limited structural approaches.  
According to Open System Theory, a system is an arrangement of interrelated 
parts. Systems are dependent upon their external environment in order to survive, and 
therefore are open to influences and transactions with the outside world as long as they 
exist. This interaction has two components: input (i.e., what enters the system from the 
outside) and output (i.e., what leaves the system and goes into the environment). In order 
to speak about the inside and the outside of a system, we need to be able to distinguish 
between the system itself and its environment. A system and its environment are in 
general separated by a boundary.49 In the case that a system does not interact with its 
environment, it starts to destroy itself because it is inherently exposed to entropy, which 
means the tendency for systems to move forward to a chaotic or random state.  As long as 
a system adapts itself to its environment, shapes its environment, or finds a favorable 
environment in which it can operate, it survives and operates successfully and effectively. 
Examination of systems reveals the following basic characteristics of systems:  
 
• They import energy and resources from the environment (input) 
• They transform this energy and resources (throughput) 
• They export a product to the environment (output) 
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Turchin eds. Principia Cybernetica Web (Principia Cybernetica, Brussels, 1998), 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/sysappr.html accessed September 22, 2008. 
 23
• They adapt their components in a dynamic pattern of activities 
(feedback)50 
2. Terrorist Organizations as Systems 
Examining terrorist organizations as systems helps us to understand every aspect 
of them in order to build effective strategies to counter them. Like other organizations in 
the world, a terrorist organization is a system that needs inputs—obtained from either 
internal or external sources—to be converted into certain outputs or activities. A terrorist 
organization needs inputs of recruits, information, shelter, and weapons, usually obtained 
from the internal environment; and cadres, publicity, material, and initial financing, often 
provided from external sources.51  
After acquiring the inputs indicated above, terrorist organizations convert these 
into outputs. As with many other organizations, terrorist organizations organize 
personnel, financial, logistics, information, communications, and operations branches to 
manage the conversion of inputs into activities. The terrorists use a wide range of 
incentives (recognition, reward, promotion) and penalties (criticism, isolation, demotion, 
and physical punishment) to spur the operations between the branches.52 In the 
conversion mechanism, the time and organizational structure that a terrorist organization 
needs to emerge, grow, organize, and execute the operations become the vital issues.  
The outputs or activities of terrorist organizations include sabotage, attacks on 
individuals, assassinations of distinguished persons in the society, public demonstrations, 
small-scale attacks, and eventually larger attacks and mobile warfare on the military 
side.53 
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Even though many terrorist organizations are not organized or structured like a 
legitimate organization, they have a structure consisting of a leader cadre and foot 
soldiers. While the leader cadre forms the ideological and strategic side of terrorist 
organizations, foot soldiers constitute the operational and tactical side of terrorist 
organizations. The number of foot soldiers is greater than leader cadre’s number and this 
make it difficult for the leader cadre to check their motivation level and ideology 
knowledge. Although the leader cadres generally remain the same in the organization, 
foot soldiers usually change due to various reasons. The leader cadre is very radicalized, 
bound to the terrorist organization, strict about their beliefs and the organization’s 
ideology. On the other hand, foot soldiers generally are not fully radicalized or totally 
loyal to the terrorist organization. It may be argued that foot soldiers may be suspicious 
about the ideologies, goals, and strategies of a terrorist organization.  
In order to counter terrorism, this ongoing system must be disrupted with the 
employment of political, social, and military sanctions. As suggested by Nathan Leites, 
the first thing to do is to “raise the cost to terrorist organizations of obtaining inputs, or 
reduce the inputs obtained for given costs,” which aims to deny inputs. The second is to 
slow down the processes by which terrorist organizations convert these inputs into 
activities, which means to reduce the efficiency of terrorist organizations’ production 
processes. Destroying or preventing outputs forms the third strategy. Finally, the fourth 
measure is to blunt the effects of terrorist organizations’ outputs on the population.54  
Nathan Leites defines the first two methods as “counterproduction,” which 
prevents terrorist organizations’ production of activities by either denying inputs or 
changing the production coefficients so that smaller outputs are generated from given 
inputs. The third method is a traditional counterforce role of military action, and the 
fourth method is analogous to passive and active defense in strategic analysis.55 
Therefore, in order to disrupt a terrorist organization system, the first two things 
that must be done are to prevent terrorist organizations from getting inputs and sever the 
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support of the target population. In this regard, terrorist organizations’ recruitment 
processes, which are crucial to their survival, must be disrupted. Influencing populations 
not to join terrorist organizations becomes the initial aspect of this strategy. Since 
terrorism is much more about the psychology of individuals, psychological operations 
can be used for influencing individuals not to join terrorist organizations, thereby 
severing the support of populations to terrorist organizations.  
Another aspect of countering terrorism is preventing the outputs of terrorist 
organizations, or at least to reduce the frequency of terrorism. This can be done by 
military measures; however, the cost of military operations and losses in the operations 
becomes the vital concern in this strategy. Therefore, psychological operations can be 
considered as a nonlethal military measure to interrupt terrorist organizational systems. In 
this strategy, since they are not fully radicalized, the foot soldiers of terrorist 
organizations become the target audience to be influenced and deterred.  
F. CONCLUSION  
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon to the world, yet it remains difficult to define 
and counter it. Terrorism has been explained in various ways, from the political level to 
the psychological level. It is also difficult to profile a terrorist; however, it may be 
concluded from the discussions above that a general terrorist could be defined as a male 
in his twenties, single and belonging to the middle class; in addition, he is educated and 
participating in working class advocacy groups.56 In short, it could be very hard to 
differentiate an average person from a prospective terrorist, since the profile of the 
terrorist is not very distinctive. Every terrorist has his/her own motivations and beliefs to 
join a terrorist organization. On the other hand, every terrorist organization has its own 
ideologies, goals, strategies, and radicalization and recruitment processes in order to 
influence populations and get support.  
Countering terrorism and terrorist organizations requires several measures that 
must be taken at the same time. Examinations of terrorist organizations as a system help 
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us to understand the mechanics of them and develop counter-strategies. As open systems, 
terrorist organizations require inputs—recruits, money, weapons, etc.—and convert these 
inputs to outputs—attacks, sabotage, assassinations, etc. Countering terrorist 
organizations requires the prevention of inputs, such as new recruits. Other strategies 
include measures to reduce the outputs by influencing foot soldiers of terrorist 
organizations. Psychological operations as nonlethal military operations can be used to 
influence populations not to join terrorist organizations and manipulate foot soldiers of 
terrorist organizations to back down their attacks, thereby severing their support.  
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III. INFLUENCE THEORIES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Every war that has been waged in the world so far is believed to have had a 
psychological dimension. Whoever can exploit and take advantage of it wins the battles, 
or at least has less loss in the battles. The Global War on Terror, since terror is all about 
the psychology of individuals, also has a psychological dimension that can be exploited 
in order to be successful.  
With their standard exercise, psychological operations decrease the motivation 
and combat efficiency of an enemy and cause dissidence and disaffection within the 
enemy’s ranks. Moreover, psychological operations may create resistance within a 
population against a hostile regime as well as against a terrorist organization. In this 
regard, psychological operations can be used as nonlethal military operations with the 
employment of social, economic, and political sanctions over a population who are 
favorable to terrorists, or over the foot soldiers of terrorist organizations. Psychological 
operations can deter terrorists, disrupt and destroy a terrorist organization’s activities, and 
influence the population to sever the support it gives to the terrorist organization. 
Since psychological operations are related to influencing a population or 
individuals, influence theories must be comprehended as a prerequisite to understanding 
psychological operations. These techniques can be used in psychological operations in 
order to influence a target population and achieve desired behaviors.  
B. INFLUENCE THEORIES 
In general, an individual influences another individual to have something done 
when other circumstances occur. Influence refers to a relation and linkage between two 
individuals, one having power over the other. Academics define influence in different 
ways. Influence, as defined by Jeffrey Pfeffer, is the power to change the course of 
events; to overcome resistance and to get people to do things that they would not 
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normally do.57 This power can be categorized as reward power, coercive power, 
legitimate power, referent power, and expert power. He asserts that each power category 
has its own influence tactics and processes for a targeted population. Bob Cialdini defines 
influence as a process and summarizes it in six principles: reciprocity, commitment and 
consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity.58 On the other hand, Anthony R. 
Pratkanis describes social influence as the processes of “conformity (creating or changing 
behavior or belief to match the response of others), persuasion or attitude change, 
(change in response to a message, discourse, or communication), compliance (change in 
response to an explicit request), yielding to social forces (change in response to the 
structure of the social situation), or helping (change in response to someone’s need).”59 
1. Cialdini’s Six Principles 
Reciprocation is the most used influence principle within a social population. In 
simplest terms, it is the same concept as tit-for-tat: I give something to you, so you must 
give something to me or I do a favor for you, so you should do another favor for me. This 
principle is the consequence of a networked society. From the beginning of history, 
individuals have the basic instinct to repay whatever they get from other people, even 
more than they get. Reciprocation can be raised from unwanted object; however, the 
probability of reciprocation increases if the object is desired or needed by the other side. 
Another point about reciprocation is that concessions, as well as goods and services, can 
be reciprocated, since individuals also have the psychological stimulation to repay others’ 
compromises.60 
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The commitment and consistency principle stems from personal and interpersonal 
pressure. According to this principle, individuals behave in accordance with their 
previous decisions and they will be consistent with things they say and they do. They will 
be trustworthy.61   
Another influence principle discussed by Cialdini is social proof, which refers to 
other peoples’ behavior. The principle asserts that what other people think or do is the 
correct behavior. We view a behavior as more correct in a situation to the degree that we 
see other people performing it.62   
In our lives, there are many individuals who have authority on various subjects. 
These authorities make many of our decisions for us when we confront unfamiliar 
situations. People will tend to obey authority figures, even they are asked to do 
objectionable acts. Authority can be used during a negotiation. If the requester has some 
sort of authority regarding the subject, the probability that a request is accepted 
increases.63  
People are persuaded easily by other people they like. In literature, there are many 
variables of how much a person is liked, such as physical attractiveness, the influencer’s 
professional background, and similarity in the area of opinions, personality traits, 
background, or lifestyle. Moreover, familiarity also plays a big role in influencing other 
individuals.64  
The last influence principle introduced by Cialdini is scarcity. Making something 
scarce is the easiest way to increase its desirability. As an influence principle, scarcity 
can be used when a time or number limit on an offer is put. If there is a limited supply of 
something, demand increases, which causes an increase in the value of the thing.65  
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These principles can be embedded into psychological operations in order to 
influence targets as well as a ground force actions.  
2. Pratkanis’ Social Influence Analysis 
The process of influence may be regarded as communication between two people; 
a source disseminates its message to a receiver by using some communication channels to 
change its behavior. Therefore, for convenience, Pratkanis divides the tactics into four 
categories, which correspond to four main tasks of a communicator: “(a) establish a 
favorable climate for the influence attempt (landscaping or pre-persuasion), (b) create a 
relationship with the audience (source credibility), (c) present the message in a 
convincing fashion, and (d) use the emotions to persuade.”66 These task categories will 
be useful for developing strategies to influence individuals not to join terrorist 
organizations. 
a. Landscaping (Pre-Persuasion) Tactics 
Landscaping (or pre-persuasion) refers to presenting “a situation in such a 
way that the target is likely to be receptive to a given course of action and respond in a 
desired manner.”67 How the situation is defined, how the problem is presented, and how a 
request is requested are the important points that must be considered. Landscaping 
comprises many tactics: 
• Define and label an issue in a favorable manner 
• Association 
• Change the meaning of an object category 
• Set expectations 
• Limit and control the number of choices and options 
• Valence framing 
• Control the range and meaning of a response  
• Set the decision criteria 
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• Agenda setting:  determining what issues will be discussed 
• Decoys  
• Phantoms 
• Establish a favorable comparison point or set 
• Control the flow of information 
• Metaphor 
• Story-telling   
• (Mis)Leading Questions 
• Perspective and point-of-view   
• Control the procedures for making a decision 
b. Tactics that Rely on Social Relationships:  Source Credibility and 
Social Roles  
Another important ingredient of influence is the reliability or credibility of 
the communicator. Research shows that establishment of a social relationship facilitates 
influence between the source and target of influence. In addition, there are a number of 
cases where sources with differing basis of credibility produce differential persuasion 
under varying treatments. In order to account for these cases, Pratkanis proposes an 
altercasting theory of source credibility as an extension of the hypothesis that credibility 
is a function of the nature of the social relationship between source and recipient. 
According to an altercasting theory, source credibility is a function of the roles taken by 
the source and recipient of a message. The following tactics describe how this can be 
accomplished, and in the process, explore the nature of relationships that promote and 
deter persuasion.68 
• Be a credible source 
• Tact altercast  
• Authority-agent altercast 
• Expert-unknowing public altercast 
• High status-admirer altercast 
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• Physically attractive-admirer altercast 
• Just plain folks: Similarity altercast 
• Associative casting and avoidant miscasting 
• Intimates (friends and lovers) altercast 
• Dependency-responsibility altercast 
• Social consensus (bandwagon)   
• Fleeting interactions 
c. Effective Message Tactics 
Since influence processes may be regarded as communication, the 
message disseminated to the targets is very important in terms of effectiveness. 
According to research, an effective persuasive message is one that focuses the targets' 
attention and cognitive activity on exactly what the communicator wants them to think. 
“Inducing the target to think of reasons for a given action, making it appear that there are 
good reasons for an action, disrupting a person’s ability to counter-argue, focusing 
attention on certain reasons, selecting the most powerful arguments, and delivering the 
message for best effect” are the tenets of an effective message.69 These are the effective 
message tactics discussed by Pratkanis:  
• Self-generated persuasion 
• Imagery sells 
• Omitting an explicit message conclusion   
• Rhetorical questions 
• Pique technique 
• Message fit:  Link the content of a message to the pre-existing beliefs, 
experiences, and knowledge of the recipient  
d. Emotional Tactics 
Emotions are generally considered to affect our rational thinking and 
better judgment. “An emotional appeal is one that uses the message recipient’s subjective 
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feelings, affect, arousal, emotions, and tension-states as the basis for securing 
influence.”70 Since our emotions affect us deeply, individuals can exploit them.  
The following tactics are used to allow a communicator to control the 
emotions of the target for desired effects. Arousing an emotion and then offering the 
target a way of responding to that emotion are the basic rules of these tactics.   
• Fear appeals 
• Guilt sells 
• Embarrass the target of influence 
• Jeer pressure  
• Flattery (ingratiation) 
• Empathy  
• Norm of reciprocity 
• Door-in-the-face (rejection-then-retreat) 
• Commitment trap 
• Foot-in-the-door  
• Low-balling 
• Bait-and-switch 
• Counter attitudinal advocacy with insufficient justification 
• Over-justification of an intrinsic activity    
• Effort justification 
• Hypocrisy reduction 
• Self-prophecy 
• Self-affirmation 
• Scarcity   
• Psychological reactance  
• Evocation of freedom  
• Positive happy mood 
                                                 
70 Pratkanis ed., The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress, 43. 
 34
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
Psychological operations should be considered as a crucial military element to 
influence populations with the employment of political, social, and economic sanctions, 
since every conflict has psychological dimensions. The perceptions of other countries and 
populations play a significant role in deterring them from implementing some actions 
against allied forces. Psychological operations, as defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 
3-05-301, are “planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign target audiences (TAs) to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 
and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals.”71 As mentioned earlier, although every conflict has a psychological 
dimension, psychological operations must be planned actions. They must target a 
population to influence them and, consequently, get the desired behaviors. The 
psychological effects of other operations cannot be categorized as psychological 
operations since they are not intentionally planned and executed. However, the 
psychological effects of other operations may cause some desired reactions against troops 
on the ground.  
1. The Importance of Psychological Operations 
To fight and conquer in all battles is not supreme excellence; supreme 
excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.72   
                Sun Tzu 
An adversary’s will can be broken in a number of ways: by application of military 
force, by economic sanctions, by loss of external support, and by military defections.73 
As Sun Tzu asserts, victory is not gained on the battlefield; rather, victory is determined 
by which side has influence over the other side’s decisions and actions. This judgment 
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inserts a psychological dimension into the conflict. A state has diplomatic, information, 
military, and economic instruments of power that enhance, when employed properly in 
concert, a state’s ability to influence and impact a target audience’s decision-making 
process. It is understood that using force to coerce behavior change is crude and 
inefficient and adds other problems. Ideas and perceptions of others must be the key 
points to influence decision-makers in this rapidly changing world. Therefore, ideas must 
be conveyed in such a way that the receiver gets the message and acts favorably 
according to the sender’s objectives.74  
This mission gives psychological operations a significant role in the exercise of 
instruments of national power. Psychological operations increase the effectiveness of 
these instruments. The purpose of implementing psychological operations is to influence 
neutral, friendly, or hostile populations and groups and get desired emotions, attitudes, 
and behavior that support the implementation of national objectives and military 
operations at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Therefore, decision-makers 
lose their ability to govern or command, the will to obey or fight, and the will to 
support.75 Psychological operations can save lives of friendly forces. By lowering 
adversary morale and reducing their efficiency, psychological operations can also prevent 
aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection within enemies’ ranks, 
ultimately inducing surrender. Ron Schleifer emphasizes the importance of psychological 
operations by asserting that “it [psychological operations] aims at stopping the enemy 
soldiers from acting like automated killing machines and start them thinking again, about 
their homes, their family, and life in general. Above all, it encourages them to think in 
moral terms while, at the same time, prompting strong feelings of guilt, all in order to 
weaken the enemy soldiers’ resolve, diminish their will to fight, and undermine their 
ability to wound or take lives; in sum, destroy their effectiveness as soldiers.”76  
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Psychological operations can be divided into three basic components:  
• Target audiences 
• Messages and themes  
• Channels of communication 
Target audiences of psychological operations can also be examined in three 
categories: the home audience, the enemy audience, and the neutrals. In times of war, a 
government tries to mobilize all the state’s resources, which requires a huge sacrifice on 
the part of the population. The government must convince the population that the war is 
worth making. Thus, the home audience becomes the first and most important audience 
in psychological operations. The second audience is the enemy audience, who must be 
convinced that the war they are waging has no chance of being won and that the cause is 
hopeless and lost; therefore, the quicker the war is over, the better. Neutral countries, 
organizations, populations, and individuals comprise the neutral audience of 
psychological operations. Though they are not involved in the conflict, they must be 
influenced in order to have their support won, or at least to prevent them from supporting 
the enemy.77 
The messages used in psychological operations are directed at a specific target 
audience and change according to the target audience. While the theme of demonizing the 
enemy is used in the messages for the home audience, neutral audiences are bombarded 
with the messages stressing justice and morality themes. On the other hand, enemy 
audiences are repeatedly told that they are waging a losing war.78 
The messages of psychological operations can be delivered to target audiences in 
several ways. While the home audience is the most accessible, the enemy audience is 
difficult to penetrate. On the other hand, the neutral audience is medium accessible in  
 
 
                                                 




terms of reaching them.79 In our century, psychological operations can utilize many 
communication assets to disseminate messages, such as radio, television, the internet, and 
written press.  
2. The Levels of Psychological Operations 
Although psychological operations may be planned and executed separately from 
other military operations, they are usually combined with other military operations in 
order to increase the effectiveness of operations. They support joint, interagency, 
multinational, conventional, and special operations forces by providing strategic, 
operational, and tactical support to a theater combatant commander at all missions across 
the full spectrum of operations. As discussed in the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05-301, 
from the United States’ point of view, psychological operations forces may provide many 
capabilities that facilitate successful mission accomplishments. These are:  
• Project a favorable image of the United States and allied forces 
• Inform target audiences in new or denied areas 
• Amplify the effects of a show-of-force 
• Give target audiences alternative courses of action 
• Overcome censorship, illiteracy, or interrupted communications 
• Exploit ethnic, cultural, religious, or economic differences80 
Moreover, psychological operations personnel perform the following traditional 
roles in order to meet the intent of a commander. 
• Influence foreign populations by conveying information to influence 
attitudes and behavior for getting compliance or desired behavioral 
changes. These actions make military operations easier by minimizing loss 
of life and collateral damage, and furthering the objectives of the 
supported commander.  
• Provide public information to foreign populations to support humanitarian 
activities, reinforce legitimacy, ease suffering, and restore civil order. 
Public information strengthens the effects of other military operations.  
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• In order to establish credibility and trust within the target population, serve 
as the commander voice to foreign population. Conveying the intent of the 
commander allows the commander to reach more people with less 
expenditure of resources and time, which is significant for the success of 
an operation.  
• Counter enemy propaganda and disinformation campaigns by conveying 
friendly intent and actions correctly, therefore, deny others ability to 
influence the population.81  
Psychological operations are planned and executed on three levels. At the 
strategic level, psychological operations deliver information to foreign populations to 
support of countries’ national goals and objectives. Government and other agencies plan 
and conduct strategic-level psychological operations and they target the decision-makers 
of countries and populations. Although strategic-level psychological operations are 
implemented by civil agencies of government, military assets are usually used in the 
development, design, production, distribution, and dissemination of strategic-level 
products. However, the agencies must coordinate and integrate at the national level of 
information in order to implement joint and multinational operations. Therefore, 
psychological operations can be useful for operations in areas such as counterterrorism, 
which has strategic implications.82  
The operational level consists of psychological operations for supporting 
combatant commanders to accomplish the mission. Operational-level psychological  
operations include regionally oriented actions prior to, during, or after conflict in support 
of a commander’s plan. These operations are planned and executed by lower-level 
agencies in a government.83  
Tactical-level psychological operations are used to support the maneuver 
commander’s ability to win battles and engagements by employing loudspeakers, radio  
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and television transmissions, and leaflets in local areas.84 At this level, psychological 
operations are conducted as an integral part of multinational, joint, and single-service 
operations. 
3. Chronological Operations Process 
Psychological operations personnel begin the planning process after getting the 
approval of decision-makers or policymakers. The psychological operations commander 
gathers resources to meet the unique administrative and operational requirements. 
Mission analysis determines the need for the accomplishment of the task. The 
psychological operations process includes five subsequent stages, which begin with 
planning and end with evaluation. Even though the process is continuous and sequential, 
multiple series may be in different phases at the same time. The process is shaped around 
the changing behavior of a foreign target audience through the execution of products and 
actions. 
a. Phase I: Planning 
The importance of planning for the success of operations cannot be 
ignored. By definition, psychological operations are planned and programmed use of 
communication media and other actions to influence others’ emotions, attitudes, and 
behaviors. Since random actions cannot produce consistent results, planning is essential 
for psychological operations. A psychological operation planning consists of several 
stages: (1) concept of operations, (2) definition of target groups, (3) clear definition of 
objectives, (4) general thematic guidance for each objective, (5) injunctions or 
prohibitions in respect to themes, (6) timetable or schedule to ensure staged and fully 
orchestrated multimedia operations, and (7) definitive instructions for psychological 
operations units and assets.85 Planners formulate the psychological operations objectives 
for the supported commander’s mission. The objectives become framework for the 
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development of the plan. After determination of the objectives and plan, potential target 
audiences are identified. Moreover, in order to assess the effectiveness of psychological 
operations, measures of effectiveness are established.86  
b. Phase II: Target Audience Analysis 
In the target audience analysis phase, potential target audiences are refined 
and analyzed. Ideal target audiences are the groups that are homogenous and share the 
same conditions and vulnerabilities.87 Once the target audiences have been identified, the 
vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, conditions, and effectiveness are analyzed. Vulnerabilities 
of a target audience are the four psychological factors that affect their behavior: 
perception, motivation, stress, and attitude. Susceptibilities of a target audience show us 
how they can be influenced to respond to the message. While conditions of the target 
audience refers to all environmental factors, such as social, political, economic, military, 
and physical, audience effectiveness refers to the capability of a target audience to give 
desired response.88       
c. Phase III: Product and Series Development and Design  
A psychological operation series includes all products and actions 
designed to influence target audiences to get desired behaviors. Since each psychological 
operation may have a different target audience, it is necessary to develop multiple series 
products. Product development and design is the process of creating product prototypes 
or creating planned actions. In this stage, the products can be created according to a target 
audience’s vulnerabilities. TV spots and radio shows with scripts, storyboards, or concept 
sketches are produced and designed during this stage. Finally, the methodologies, used to 
test the products, such as surveys, questionnaires, expert panels or other standard means, 
may be determined at this stage.89   
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d. Phase IV: Approval, Production, Distribution, and 
Dissemination 
The psychological operations products in the series must be approved 
prior to execution in order to prevent any wrong messages disseminated. After getting 
approval from the authorities involved, the products are translated, pretested, modified, 
and produced as organic visual, audio, and audiovisual assets. The completed products 
are distributed physically or electronically, according to the product, to dissemination 
centers. The products are then disseminated to the target audience using a variety of 
dissemination methods, depending upon the type of product: audio, visual, or 
audiovisual.90 
e. Phase V: Evaluation 
The evaluation stage refers to ascertaining the effectiveness of products 
over time. This is accomplished by analyzing impact indicators (results of effectiveness 
measures) and determining to what extent the objectives have been accomplished—in 
short, whether the target audience has shown the desired behavior change. In addition, the 
other phases also include evaluation stages in order to produce effective products.  
4. Psychological Operations in Counterterrorism 
Terrorism is also a species of psychological warfare waged by terrorists through 
the media. Terrorists and their organizations are waging this war in order to win the 
hearts and minds of populations. It is understood that the war against terrorism will not be 
won with bombs and missiles. The way to counter psychological warfare must be with 
psychological warfare; thus, psychological operations must be the primary weapon in 
counterterrorism. In a terrorist organization, psychological operations may inject internal 
mistrust, causing internal power competitions and inter-group conflicts, including major 
disagreements about tactics and techniques.  
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Countering terrorism requires two major elements of a nation’s psychological 
operations program. These are: 
• Inhibiting potential terrorists from joining terrorist groups 
• Producing dissension within groups, reducing support for groups and their 
leaders, and facilitating exit from groups91 
These are the elements of strategic psychological operations that must be 
conducted over decades. In this regard, populations and the foot soldiers of terrorist 
organizations become the target audience of psychological operations. The media and the 
Internet can be used as instruments for conveying the messages. These elements can be 
closely examined in two categories within the perspective of psychological operations. 
a. Inhibiting Potential Terrorists from Joining Terrorist Groups 
In countering terrorism, the first, most significant, and most difficult 
element is preventing individuals from joining terrorist groups. Psychological operations 
at the strategic and operational levels can be used to influence and prevent people from 
joining terrorist organizations. Individuals join terrorist organizations for varied reasons. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, individuals have their own motivations and reasons 
in joining terrorist organizations and terrorist organizations have their own radicalization 
and recruitment processes to get new recruits.  
It is clear that the major influence for joining terrorist organizations is 
social settings and friendship. Therefore, psychological operations must focus on these 
relationships. The influence tactics and techniques (social proof, liking) should be used 
here. The messages must be sent by using the social leaders in the population and the 
products should contain messages dispraising terrorists and terrorism. In addition, 
educational and economic programs must be conducted with psychological operations. 
In order to conduct effective psychological operations, the perceptions, 
beliefs, and other psychological factors of populations should be completely understood. 
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Otherwise, the desired behavior of populations cannot be obtained and terrorist 
organizations can continue to recruit new members.   
b. Producing Dissension within the Group and Facilitating Exits 
from the Group 
Terrorist organizations are often fraught with tension. The longer they are 
inactive, the more the tension within the group increases. Psychological operations 
should magnify this tension by sowing distrust within terrorist organizations. Foot 
soldiers of terrorist organizations must be addressed since foot soldiers can be persuaded 
easily. They are not completely radicalized in their beliefs and have many things that they 
hold dear. The messages must contain the bad image of the leader cadre, which may 
inject distrust and reduce cohesion within the organization.92 Apprehended terrorists can 
be used to address this population. Moreover, the success of other conventional 
operations also can be used as a deterrent asset. The vulnerabilities of terrorist 
organizations that can be obtained through examination of motivations, ideologies, and 
radicalization processes can be used to influence foot soldiers. 
D. CONCLUSION  
Every conflict in the world has a psychological dimension. Since terrorism is a 
form of psychological warfare, countering it must include psychological warfare. As a 
general definition, psychological operations are planned operations that convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign target audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals.93 Psychological operations decrease the 
motivation and combat efficiency of an enemy and cause dissidence and disaffection 
within the enemies’ ranks. Moreover, psychological operations may create resistance 
within a population against a hostile regime as well as against a terrorist organization. In 
this regard, psychological operations can be used as nonlethal military operations, with 
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the employment of social, economic, and political sanctions, over a population who are 
favorable to terrorists or over the foot soldiers of a terrorist organization. Psychological 
operations can be used to deter terrorists, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations’ 
activities, and influence the population to sever the support given to the terrorist 
organizations. 
Psychological operations are conducted on three levels: strategic, operational, and 
tactical; and five phases: planning, target audience analysis, production, dissemination, 
and evaluation. Psychological operations may be regarded as communication between 
two people; a source disseminates its message to a receiver by using some 
communication channels to change its behavior. In this regard, influence techniques 
introduced by Cialdini and Pratkanis could be used to increase the effectiveness of 
messages. These techniques could be helpful to influence target audiences. In terms 
countering terrorism, a population and the foot soldiers of a terrorist organization become 
the target audiences. The media and the Internet via social leaders can be used as 
effective communication channels. However, messages must contain appropriate context, 




It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not 
be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do 
know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your 
enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle. 
                   Sun Tzu 
In the 21st century, intelligence becomes indisputably important in order to 
achieve victory in the battlefield. As indicated in the tenets of Sun Tzu, a country must 
know its enemy’s capabilities and actions to defeat it. If a country does not have proper 
intelligence about its enemy’s capabilities and operations, the conflict may lead to a 
catastrophic outcome.  
The same assumption is also relevant for every military operation in countering 
terrorism. As in every other conventional military operation, psychological operations 
also require accurate information and intelligence about target audiences in order to 
increase the operations’ effectiveness.     
B. INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 
Intelligence refers to information that is collected, processed, and narrowed to the 
needs of policymakers and used by these policymakers for making decisions. It can be 
argued that intelligence is a subset of a broader category of information. To understand 
this definition of intelligence, the difference between information and intelligence has to 
be emphasized. Policymakers in the statecraft and soldiers in command of the battlefield 
need intelligence in order to make the right decisions for dealing with their adversaries. 
Acquiring accurate intelligence is the outcome of a process which begins with gathering 
raw data and continues with the collation of data and, in turn, transforming them into 
specific information. All intelligence is information; however, all information is not 
intelligence. In the publication of U.S. Joint Chief of Staff named “Joint Intelligence, JP 
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2-0,” the relationship between data, information, and intelligence is very well depicted 
graphically. According to this graphic, data is collected in the operational environment. 
After “processing and exploitation,” it turns into information. Then by the process of 
“analysis and production,” this information turns into intelligence. In this context, 
“intelligence has two critical features that make it different from information. Intelligence 
allows anticipation or prediction of future situations and circumstances and it informs 
decisions by illuminating the differences in available courses of actions.”94 
In his book entitled “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,” Mark M. Lowenthal 
defines intelligence as “the process, by which specific types of information important to 
national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the 
products of that processes; the safeguarding of these process and this information by 
counter intelligence activities; and the carrying out operations as requested by law lawful 
authorities.”95 
By this turn, intelligence can be regarded as a product of information processes. 
This intelligence process comprises many steps and stages, which begin with a decision-
maker’s request for information about an adversary and finish in the receipt of obtained 
and analyzed intelligence by decision-makers. The intelligence cycle includes stages as 
follows: identifying requirements, collection, processing and exploitation, analyses and 
production, dissemination, consumption, and feedback.96  
The intelligence efforts begin with determining the requirements, which mean 
policy and military issues and areas. Every country has a wide variety of national security 
issues and foreign policy interests, both militarily and diplomatically. Decision-makers 
determine what kind of information they need in order to make decisions about these 
issues. Therefore, they want intelligence agents to gather the available information about 
adversaries associated with security interests and provide them with intelligence, through 
which they reach a final resolution.97   
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Once decision-makers determine their requirements and priorities, the necessary 
intelligence must be collected. The collection assets are generally determined by 
intelligence requirements and there are many collection disciplines, all of which have 
significant and unique characteristics. These disciplines are human intelligence, image 
intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open source intelligence, and signal 
intelligence.98 It is important to involve as many collection disciplines as possible on the 
major issues in order to obtain the required information in as accurate a form as 
possible.99 However, while some information is obtained by specific collection 
disciplines, the usage of these disciplines does not provide the exact information that 
intelligence agents are searching for. For instance, while an adversary’s military order of 
battle can be obtained accurately with the utilization of imagery intelligence, the 
personnel identification of these units can be obtained by using other intelligence 
disciplines, such as human intelligence.  
Intelligence does not necessarily mean raw information about an enemy. 
Information obtained by different kinds of collection assets is processed and exploited by 
specialists. Processing and exploitation are the stages where the raw technical 
information is converted to intelligence.100     
The major stage in the intelligence cycle is the analysis and production stage. The 
obtained and processed information is analyzed and interpreted into intelligence, which 
decision-makers can use in their final resolutions. In this stage, the information is 
interpreted into two kinds of intelligence: current intelligence, which focuses on issues 
that have top priority in a decision-maker’s agenda and needs immediate attention, and 
long-term intelligence, which deals with trends and issues for future interactions.101 After 
this stage, intelligence becomes ready for a decision-maker’s usage.  
Another important stage in the intelligence cycle is the dissemination and 
consumption stage. Unless intelligence is distributed to policymakers, who need it for 
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their decisions, the whole effort in getting this intelligence becomes futile. Therefore, the 
analyzed and interpreted intelligence must be disseminated to key personnel at the time 
and location they need it. The dissemination process generally is standardized and 
intelligence is distributed to the consumer through many types of reports.  
The last stage is the feedback stage, which requires communication between 
consumers and the intelligence community. After receiving and using intelligence, 
consumers are expected to give their feedback about the usefulness and suitability of the 
intelligence. Often, this stage does not function well, because the consumers are 
unawareness of his requirement to provide feedback. 
C. INTELLIGENCE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
Intelligence is one of the key elements of military operations and an important 
part of every combat decision. Decision-makers need intelligence to judge an adversary’s 
course of action, understand the battlefield, and determine the adversary’s course of 
action. Intelligence drives operations. Operations cannot be properly planned and 
successfully executed without intelligence about the enemy. The operations environment 
requires an understanding of the enemy, who is constantly adapting new techniques, 
tactics, and procedures for combat. In order to gain this understanding, one must have 
efficient intelligence collection apparatuses and analysis of the enemy. As in other 
military operations, psychological operations also require intelligence of the enemy. The 
relationship between intelligence and psychological operations must be close and 
continuous, since psychological operations require timely, accurate, and most 
importantly, relevant intelligence about the enemy. Without proper intelligence, an entire 
psychological operation campaign could be directed toward the wrong audience or could 
produce undesirable consequences.    
The intelligence requirements for psychological operations are significantly 
different from those of conventional operations. While conventional units need 
intelligence about an adversary’s forces’ numbers, order of battle, weapon systems, and 
course of action, psychological operation units need information concerning the opinions, 
attitudes, beliefs, sensitiveness, and patterns of rational and non-rational behavior of the 
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adversary.102 The collection method of these requirements also differs from that of the 
requirements of operational intelligence. Operational intelligence could be obtained via 
the collection disciplines, which depend on tangible products such as photo, signal, etc. 
However, intelligence for psychological operations can best be obtained through social 
interaction with the population and with open intelligence sources such as newspapers, 
magazines, books, academic journals, and foreign broadcasts. Furthermore, a 
psychological operations unit may also request intelligence collection for specific items 
of factual information.  
Intelligence requirements for psychological operations products fall into three 
broad and overlapping categories: target audience determination and analysis, theme 
development, and product dissemination.103  
The intelligence required for the development of effective psychological 
operations for the Global War on Terror can be determined according to decisions as to 
how a country wants to counter terrorism. As discussed above, psychological operations 
can be used for severing the support of a population from terrorist organizations and 
influencing the foot soldiers of a terrorist organization. In other words, reducing support 
for terrorist organizations, preventing potential individuals from joining terrorist 
organizations, producing dissention within groups, and facilitating exits from the group 
must be the major elements of the psychological program of a country.104 In this 
instance, the target audience of a psychological operation becomes the population from 
whom the terrorist organization gets their recruits, as well as the foot soldiers of the 
terrorist organization.  
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1. Target Audience Analysis 
Target audience analysis includes defining the key issues, concerns, and themes 
of a target audience; in short, defining potential vulnerabilities. One must understand the 
perceptions and concerns of a target audience and know what will influence and motivate 
them.105 Therefore, intelligence must portray a target audience as completely as possible, 
in order for psychological operation planners to determine the vulnerabilities of the target 
population.  
Considering that the target audiences of psychological operations for countering 
terrorism are the population and the foot soldiers of a terrorist organization, cultural 
intelligence helps us to clarify target audience analysis and intelligence requirements. 
Cultural intelligence, as defined by John Coles, is the “analyzed social, political, 
economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or 
nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviors.”106 
Cultural intelligence helps us to clarify why people act as they do and what they think. It 
provides insights into the target population’s vulnerabilities, which can be exploited. 
Cultural intelligence, as discussed by Coles, provides a baseline for designing successful 
strategies for interacting with foreign peoples, whether they are allies, neutrals, or people 
of an occupied territory. It gives the commander as well as the soldier the knowledge to 
anticipate reactions to selected courses of action. Cultural intelligence enables forces to 
successfully interact with foreigners and achieve operation objectives.107 The detailed 
information to influence the emotions, motives, and behavior of a target audience can be 
obtained, organized, converted to cultural intelligence by intelligence agents using the 
intelligence process, and used in psychological operation products.  
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In order to understand a target audience’s decision-making process, commanders 
and psychological operations personnel must have data about physical, informational, and 
cognitive properties of the information environment. The physical and informational 
properties of the environment include properties relevant to infrastructures, processes, 
technical designs, networks, and so forth. However, cognitive properties of the 
information environment consist of psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human 
attributes that influence decision-making; the flow of information; and the interpretation 
of information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization. Cognitive 
properties may include:  
• Cultural and societal factors affecting attitudes and perceptions such as 
language, education, history, religion, myths, personal experience, and 
family structure 
• Identity of key individuals and groups affecting attitudes and perceptions, 
whether in the same or a different country as those they influence 
• Identities and psychological profiles of key decision-makers, their 
advisors, key associates, and/or family members who influence them 
• Credibility of key individuals or groups and specification of their sphere 
of influence 
• Laws, regulations, and procedures relevant to information and decision-
making processes, capability employment doctrine, timeliness, and 
information content 
• How leaders think, perceive, plan, execute, and assess outcomes of their 
results and actions from their perspectives 
• Identification of key historical events between countries which may affect 
an individual’s or a group’s attitudes and perceptions, whether in the same 
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Examining these properties broadly and in detail will be useful for developing 
psychological operations plans, programs, and products that will influence a target 
audience.  
History: Studying the history of a country or a population is helpful for several 
reasons, in order to develop effective psychological operations plans and products. These 
reasons include discerning a pattern of behavior; understanding how a target audience 
perceives its history; determining the relative importance of political, social, and 
economic factors; and identifying historical issues that remain significant today and 
resonate with the population.109 
Natural Environment: The natural environment plays a significant role in a 
society’s behavior. It affects the society’s population growth, distribution and migration, 
as well as its culture and daily life, which are essential for psychological operations.110 
Political System: The political system of a country is important from two 
perspectives for psychological operations planners. Psychological operations planners 
must understand the formal political structure of the government and the sources of its 
power (legitimacy) and determine the most important issues in this system.111  
Political Economy: Since almost every political decision has an economic 
outcome, economics have an impact on politics. Therefore, economic issues are 
important to psychological operations specialists in order to better understand the 
strength of competing groups in a society.112 
Military: In most societies, military plays an important role by intervening in 
politics. Therefore, it becomes crucial for psychological operations planners to determine 
the military’s role in a society, and how the government and population view the 
military.113 
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Ideology: Every society has a value system that generates a certain ideology. 
Most members of a society are aware of this ideology, though they may or may not agree 
with it. This ideology can integrate communities, advance the position of a particular 
group, and strengthen group resolve to act to change the status quo. Understanding a 
society’s ideology and the acceptance or rejection of it by certain groups provides the 
psychological operations specialists with insights into target audiences’ willingness to 
change their attitudes or behavior.114 
Religion: Religions influence not only a society’s political, economic, and social 
systems, but also aspects of a person’s life. Since a target audience’s perception of any 
persuasion is filtered through their religious beliefs, the impact of religion is critical for 
psychological operations planners to analyze.115 
Leadership: In society, leaders use motives, purposes, and resources to mobilize 
other people. For psychological operations planners, influencing leaders can be a key step 
in affecting the behavior of a target audience. Without this aspect, the message for a 
target audience becomes propaganda from an occupying force and it becomes very hard 
for a target population to accept the message. In this regard, the behavior of leaders, their 
decision-making process, and their vulnerabilities become essential for developing 
psychological operations products.116  
Ethnicity: There may be ethnic groups, which may not belong to the politically 
dominant groups, maintaining their own distinct cultural or social differences, within a 
target audience. Determining whether an ethnic group is critical in the behavior of a 
target audience is useful for planners.117  
The Media: In any society, both news and literary media affect the national will 
of the country and play a significant role in determining political direction and national 
security objectives and policies, since they are more available to the society’s leadership 
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and population. Psychological operation planners must understand the role and effects of 
the media over a target population and examine the availability of media to disseminate 
psychological operations products.118 
2. Theme and Product Development 
The second category of the intelligence requirement is theme and product 
development. In order to compose an effective message to the target audience, terrorist 
organizations must be examined in detail, both structurally and ideologically. Examining 
terrorist organizations helps to identify their vulnerabilities, which will be the major 
theme and subject of psychological operations products.  
The intelligence requirements for theme and production can be determined by 
modeling the operating systems and social networks of terrorist organizations. This 
approach provides us with the understanding of their structural vulnerabilities. Terrorist 
organizations, like many other organizations in the world, all have an operating system. 
Terrorist organizations require that certain inputs—obtained from either internal or 
external sources—be converted into certain outputs or activities. In general, terrorist 
organizations need inputs of manpower, information, shelter, and food, especially as 
obtained from internal sources; as well as cadres, publicity, material, and initial 
financing, often provided by external resources. The inputs acquired are converted into 
outputs by terrorist organizations. As with other organizations, terrorist organizations 
tend to supervise personnel, finances, logistics, intelligence, communications, and 
operations branches to manage the conversion of inputs into activities; they also use 
incentives such as recognition, reward, and promotion, and penalties such as criticism, 
isolation, and physical punishment to stimulate operations.119 A terrorist organization’s 
processes reveal many intelligence clues for psychological operations products. In this 
regard, the recruitment and conversion process is the first intelligence requirement for 
psychological operations in countering terrorism.  
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Recruitment Process: The methods used in the recruitment and conversion 
stages can be exploited by psychological operation units. Although every terrorist 
organization has its own recruitment process, some general stages are crucial in the 
recruitment process for every terrorist organization.  
As discussed in previous chapters, although there are a great variety of 
recruitment processes that might be used by different terrorist organizations, a review of 
literature reveals a few common structures.120 There are four approaches used by terrorist 
organizations to disseminate their messages to a target population; namely, the net 
approach, the funnel approach, the infection approach, and the seed crystal approach. 
Examining these recruitment processes is useful in developing effective psychological 
operations products.  
Intelligence agents can acquire information about the recruitment process of a 
terrorist organization through open sources as well as surrendered or captured terrorists or 
civilian detainees of terrorist organizations. The declarations, speeches, and rhetoric of 
leaders, as well as documents obtained from terrorists, are the most significant sources of 
this information. After getting the information, intelligence analysts convert this 
information to intelligence, which psychological operations units can use in their product 
development.  
Conversion Process: As discussed earlier, after recruiting new members into 
their organizations, terrorists use many methods in order to produce their outputs, such as 
attacks, sabotage, violence against individuals, and public violence. They use incentives 
such as recognition, reward, and promotion; and penalties such as criticism, isolation, and 
physical punishment to compliance. The leaders sometimes use inappropriate incentives 
to motivate the foot soldiers. They may not treat every member in the organization 
equally, which may cause dissidence within the organization. Accordingly, intelligence 
about the process can be helpful in developing psychological operations products to 
influence foot soldiers.  
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General Structure: General structure of a terrorist organization is also a 
significant source of information to exploit. The leader cadre, personnel, and the 
communication method form the general structure of an organization. The leader cadre 
manages the organization and generally makes decisions about personnel, finances, and 
logistics, and communication enables a leader to provide vision and direction to those 
that manage and direct the organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded 
forces. Psychological operations could focus on leader cadres’ personal characteristics 
and weaknesses. The different social and racial groups within terrorist organizations, 
particularly in transnational terrorist organizations, can also be taken into consideration to 
develop effective products. 
Ideology: Terrorism is defined as “acts of violence intentionally perpetrated on 
civilian non-combatants with the goal of furthering some ideological, religious, or 
political objective.”121 As understood from this definition, terrorist organizations use 
terrorism to impose their ideology upon populations. In this regard, the ideology of 
terrorist organizations can be considered another intelligence requirement for 
psychological operations.  
Ideologies generally are based on a set of shared beliefs that explain and justify a 
set of agreed upon behavioral rules. For terrorists, ideology helps to provide “the moral 
and political vision that inspires their violence, shapes the way in which they see the 
world, and defines how they judge the actions of people and institutions.”122 For a 
rational person, terrorist organizations’ ideologies may include many improper aspects 
that can be used in psychological operations. Showing falseness of ideology can cause 
exits from terrorist organizations.  
Terrorists’ Motivations: Terrorist motivation is another key factor in 
understanding whether, how, and which individuals in a given environment will enter the 
process of becoming a terrorist. As discussed chapter II, one’s motivation for engaging in 
terrorism is often presumed to be the cause of joining a terrorist organization. Some 
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schools of thought point towards terrorist motivations as the key factors that cause 
individuals to join terrorist organizations and engage in terrorist activity. These 
motivational categories are the feeling of injustice, identity, and belonging. Knowing this 
provides an enormous information source for psychological operations designed to 
influence the foot soldiers of terrorist organizations.  
Terrorist Organizations’ Goals and Strategies: Goals and strategies are other 
aspects of terrorist organizations that can be used in psychological operations to influence 
a target population. Since psychological operations aim to show a target population that 
they are waging a lost war, terrorist organizations’ goals and strategies must be analyzed 
and the vulnerabilities in those aspects must be presented in the psychological operations 
product.  
3. Product Dissemination 
The final stage of intelligence requirements is the actual delivery of the 
psychological operations products to the intended audience. There are a wide variety of 
means of disseminating messages, depending on the target audience. Furthermore, it is 
important to reach the entire audience, not only a part of it.  
Even though psychological operations units have the means to disseminate 
messages by operating organic television, radio, and print operations, the operations 
effectiveness increases in the case that an existing host nation’s media is used. It is 
important to collect information on the host nation’s facilities’ capabilities, audience, 
programming type, ownership and control, and credibility.  
Some organizations may use unique forms of communication and slang, which 
enable them to communicate easily. Knowing and using these communication properties 
may greatly increase the understanding and acceptance of the message by the target 
audience. Defectors or host nation personnel can provide vital insight in collecting 
information in this area.  
The means and time for dissemination of messages are crucial for the 
effectiveness of the messages. How much a target audience has access to products and 
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understand the content of messages is key. Product dissemination involves transmitting 
products directly to the target audience via the desired media. As an example, the Internet 
started being used among terrorist organizations in many different ways in order to 
achieve their goals. Psychological operations can take advantage of the Internet to 
disseminate the messages and the products to target population. How much a target 
audience has access to the Internet becomes an important intelligence requirement to 
conduct effective psychological operations. In this regard, media analysis must be done 
during earlier stages to determine the best method and time for reaching the target 
audience.  
Some intelligence requirements for the product dissemination stage are same as 
other stages’ requirements. Since a message must be disseminated to influential 
individuals in the population, a network analysis of population and organization is 
necessary.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Intelligence drives operations. Without proper intelligence, operations cannot be 
properly planned or successfully executed. Decision-makers need intelligence to judge an 
adversary’s course of action, understand the battlefield, and determine their course of 
action according to adversary’s course of action. In addition to other military operations, 
psychological operations also require having intelligence of the enemy. The relationship 
between intelligence and psychological operations must be close and continuous since 
psychological operations require timely, accurate, and most importantly, relevant 
intelligence about the enemy. Without proper intelligence, an entire psychological 
operations campaign could be directed toward the wrong audience or could produce 
undesirable consequences.  
The intelligence requirements for psychological operations are significantly 
different from those of conventional operations. Conventional units need intelligence 
about adversaries’ forces’ numbers, order of battle, weapon systems, and courses of 
action; however, psychological operations units need information concerning the 
perceptions, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, sensitiveness, and patterns of rational and non-
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rational behavior of adversaries.123 In addition to that, the collection method of these 
requirements also differs from the operational intelligence requirements. Intelligence for 
psychological operations can be best obtained through social interaction with the 
population and open intelligence sources such as newspapers, magazines, books, 
academic journals, and foreign broadcasts. 
Intelligence requirements for psychological operations products fall into three 
broad and overlapping categories: target audience determination and analysis, theme 
development, and product dissemination.124  
Target audience analysis includes defining the key issues, concerns, and themes 
of the target audience; in short, defining potential vulnerabilities. Considering that the 
target audiences of psychological operations for countering terrorism are the population 
and the foot soldiers of terrorist organizations, cultural intelligence helps us to clarify 
target audience analysis and intelligence requirements. In addition, examining properties 
of populations, such as history, political system, and political economy, broadly and in 
detail, will be useful for developing psychological operations plans, programs, and 
products that will influence a target audience.  
In order to compose an effective message to the target audience, terrorist 
organizations must be examined in detail, both structurally and ideologically. Examining 
terrorist organizations helps to identify their vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities will be 
the major theme and subject of psychological operations products. These requirements 
can be obtained through the examination of terrorist motivations; terrorist organizations’ 
radicalization, recruitment, and conversion processes; ideology; and general structure.  
The intelligence requirements for product dissemination include the examination 
of the means and timing for disseminating the psychological operations’ products. Which 
means can be used and how much a target population has access into products become 
the major issues.  
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V. ANALYSIS OF AL-QAEDA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2001 terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center was the 
twenty-first major attack conducted by al-Qaeda. In the aftermath of these attacks, the 
United States started and led the Global War on Terrorism. The United States has made 
significant improvements in disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations’ activities. 
The destruction of al-Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, the elimination of many group 
leaders and the growing resolve of many countries in taking action against al-Qaeda and 
it associates are significant successes of the United States’ strategy of counter terrorism. 
However, al-Qaeda has adapted new methods to recruit members and conduct attacks 
against the United States’ forces especially deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan 
In order to counter al-Qaeda, the psychological dimensions of terrorism must be 
comprehended by political and military leaders of countries in this war on terrorism. The 
nature of al-Qaeda and its members, such as their motivations, beliefs, ideologies, 
strategies, and tactics, as well as the connection between al-Qaeda and different layers of 
the population in those regions, must be defined and completely understood.  Thus, the 
vulnerabilities, which can be obtained from analysis of nature and connection, have to be 
determined in order to degrade terrorists’ morale and motivation and sever the connection 
between al-Qaeda and populations.  From that standpoint, al-Qaeda must be destroyed; its 
leadership structure in the short run and its ideology in the long run.125  
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B. VULNERABILITIES OF AL-QAEDA 
Al-Qaeda is a transnational Sunni Islamist terrorist group. It presents the world 
with a new kind of threat. Highly educated and disciplined individuals represent the core 
of the group. Although al-Qaeda consists of fewer than 1,000 dedicated members,126 it is 
believed that it operates in 60 countries all around the world.  
Despite intense government countermeasures in the world, al-Qaeda has 
implemented devastating operations from the air, land, and sea, such as the USS Cole 
operation in October 2000, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Madrid railway 
bombing in March 2004, the Sinai resort bombings of October 2004, and the London 
bombings of July 2005.127 Although it has been degraded by losses in Afghanistan, it 
remains a potent threat to the United States. Countering al-Qaeda is thus likely to 
preoccupy U.S. national security institutions for at least the remainder of the decade, and 
probably longer.  
Capturing or killing al-Qaeda leaders is only a matter of appropriate military and 
intelligence. As long as information is possessed, it is very easy to destroy the leader 
cadre. It is obvious that capturing and killing al-Qaeda leaders would “diminish the scale 
of the threat, hinder their ability to coordinate operations, restrict their financing, and set 
back the recruitment, training, and deployment of new terrorist operatives.”128 However, 
neutralizing al-Qaeda leaders does not end the threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, 
since al-Qaeda today “has become more an idea or a concept than an organization; an 
amorphous movement tenuously held together by a loosely networked transnational 
constituency rather than a monolithic, international terrorist organization with either a 
defined or identifiable command and control apparatus.”129 The war against al-Qaeda  
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will be a protracted struggle. Since it has been proved that military operations alone 
cannot end the threat of al-Qaeda, influence must be first strategy used in destroying this 
organization in this protracted war.  
Moreover, it is obvious that al-Qaeda’s core group is disciplined, relentless, and 
fanatical and probably cannot be deterred to any significant degree. They undoubtedly 
will continue to launch their attacks until they are captured, killed, or decisively defeated.  
The lust for “martyrdom” by middle and lower levels of al-Qaeda members makes it 
difficult to deter them. It is therefore easier to discourage potential recruits from joining 
al-Qaeda than to stop them from attacking before they are indoctrinated and prepared for 
what they are persuaded is religious martyrdom. In order to deter a potential recruit from 
joining, it is helpful to know the vulnerabilities of an enemy. In order to manifest the 
vulnerabilities of al-Qaeda, first, al-Qaeda’s ideology will be discussed.    
1. Ideology of al-Qaeda  
Al-Qaeda’s ideology is founded on Islamism and the pursuit of jihad. Many 
Islamists have incorrectly interpreted jihad as a Holy War against western countries. 
According to a dictionary definition, jihad is the “exertion of one’s utmost effort in order 
to attain a goal or to repel something detestable.”130 In Sharia, Islamic rules, the concept 
of jihad includes absolute personal sacrifice in order to raise the word of Allah, to aid his 
fight.131 In the Quran, jihad is used in many different contexts, such as “recognizing and 
loving the Allah; resisting the pressure of parents, peers and society, [who are infidels]; 
staying on the straight path [consistently]; striving for religious deeds; having the courage 
and steadfastness to convey the message of Islam; defending Islam and the community; 
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defending all of the above through pre-emptive strikes; winning the freedom to inform, 
educate, and convey the message of Islam in an open and free environment, and thus 
freeing people from tyranny.”132  
Traditionally, “jihad” has two dominant meanings. The “greater jihad” refers to 
“personal struggle,” and the “lesser jihad” refers to the “holy war.” Personal struggle 
consists of “go[ing] through to resist temptation, become[ing] more righteous individuals, 
and build[ing] a better Muslim community.”133 On the other hand, the “holy war” means 
the “protection of the Muslim community through a call to arms.”134  
In a military context, jihad is divided into two roles, offensive and defensive 
jihad. If one attacks an enemy in his own territory, it is called an offensive jihad. 
Defensive jihad refers to the expelling of an enemy from the jihadist’s homeland. While 
the offensive jihad is not obligatory for every Muslim, the defensive jihad is compulsory 
for every Muslim in the world.135  The six principles of jihad are: 
1. Jihad is for the sake of Allah, not for the sake of wealth, goods, fame, 
glory, or power;  
2. Obedience to the imam; 
3. Avoid misappropriating booty; 
4. Respect the pledges of protection;  
5. Manifest endurance under attack; and 
6. Avoid corruption.  
Al-Qaeda leaders and members generally misinterpret the jihad concept and use it 
as a justification of their violence. The renewed commitment to defensive jihad and the 
promotion of violence against the Saudi government and the United States started with 
the presence of the United States and other non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia during the 
1991 Gulf War.136   
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In the early 1990s, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia at all costs 
was the first goal of terrorist Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden criticized the Saudi royal 
family publicly and alleged that their invitation of foreign troops to the Arabian Peninsula 
was an insult to the sanctity of the birthplace of Islam and a betrayal of the global Islamic 
community. Bin Laden’s radical views sharpened in the following years; finally, bin 
Laden issued a declaration of jihad against the United States in 1996. The declaration 
consisted of a condemnation of the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, critiques of 
the international sanctions on Iraq, U.S. support for Israel’s presence in the region, and 
ongoing massacres—according to bin Laden—in Tajikistan, Burma, and Kashmir. He 
argued that the Islamic world should unite, get together, as an umma— entire community 
of Muslims bound together by religion— and defend Islam against the United States and 
other apostate regimes. Bin Laden also urged Muslims to find a leader to unite them and 
establish a “pious caliphate,” which would be governed by Sharia and follow Islamic 
principles.137  
Even though bin Laden did not have any formal education on the teachings of 
Islam, and did not have any traditional Islamic religious credentials or authority, in 1998, 
he issued another fatwa, or religious edict, asserting that the United States had made a 
clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims through its policies in the 
Islamic world. He called every Muslim to defend Islam and targeted American civilians 
as well as military personnel. After this fatwa, al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania (1998); the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen (2000); and the twin towers of the 
World Trade Center in New York City, NY and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. 
(2001). These attacks caused many civil and military personnel deaths. Bin Laden refused 
direct responsibility for these attacks; however, he approved of the strikes and stated that 
he shared the motivations of the individuals who carried out the attacks.138   
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In summary, these issues were identified by bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
the second and prominent leader of al-Qaeda, in numerous speeches as causes for jihad:  
1. Western forces and civilians on the Arabian Peninsula, 
2. The West’s imposition of artificially low oil prices, 
3. Unqualified American support for Israel, 
4. American support for powers that oppress Muslims, 
5. American military presence in Muslim countries outside the Arabian 
Peninsula, and 
6. American support and protection for Muslim tyrannies.139 
There are many false aspects of al-Qaeda’s jihad interpretation, which could be 
used in psychological operations products for influencing people not to join al-Qaeda. 
The first and most important one is the killing of innocent people living in the region of 
the site of an operation. The killing of non-combatants is definitely forbidden in Islam, 
without regard to their religious beliefs. However, al-Qaeda misinterprets some verses of 
the Quran to justify violence and the killing of innocent people. Historically, al-Qaeda 
has been at its weakest theologically and ideologically when trying to justify the killing 
of innocents. In one of his letters, Zawahiri warns Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of 
al-Qaeda associated group in Iraq, about the probable negative effects of killing innocent 
people within Muslim societies. Zawahiri justifies the killing of innocent people because 
of Mas'alatut al-Tatarrus (the issue of non-Muslims taking Muslims as human 
shields).140 Nevertheless, the concept of Mas'alatut al-Tatarrus refers to “the instrument 
of war known as the human shield as a way of protecting someone from the attacks of an 
enemy.”141 Zawahiri did not offer any detailed analysis to explain or justify this assertion. 
In conclusion, al-Qaeda does not have any current credible justification for killing 
innocent people.  
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The other false aspect of al-Qaeda’s ideology is that it calls every Muslim to 
defend the countries that were invaded by the United States or other Western States. They 
make use of the defensive jihad concept to attempt to convince individuals. It is obvious 
that many Muslims feel humiliation and resentment over the invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq and the continued bloodshed of their co-religionists in Palestine, Chechnya, and 
Kashmir, among other places.142 Moreover, the inappropriate treatment of prisoners at 
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay also helped al-Qaeda easily persuade individuals to 
join them or their affiliated groups, since they interpreted the actions as an attack on 
Islam as well as their lives. Unless the United States justifies invasions, giving rational 
reasons for them, al-Qaeda will always have leverage it can use to recruit more people. In 
this case, the United States must carry out effective information operations by 
highlighting values that are common to western and Muslim worlds, explaining the real 
reasons of the invasions such as destroying the evil regimes, freeing the Afghani and 
Iraqi people, and founding democratic and stable regimes that provide wealth and equal 
opportunity for populations. The key entities that would be able to influence populations 
in this ideological war and could be used in information operations are Muslim 
governments and local imams in these countries. Unless the United States justifies the 
invasions, disproves terrorists’ claims, and hinders people from joining terrorist 
organizations, the War on Terror will not end.  
2. The Goals and Strategies of al-Qaeda 
As an Islamic terrorist organization, al-Qaeda has a main goal: to destroy the 
apostate regimes in Muslim countries, take over the world, and turn it into an Islamic 
State or Global Caliphate.143 The same objective is also espoused by other Islamic 
terrorist organizations in the world. In order to achieve this goal, Islamic terrorist 
organizations have followed different strategies over the course of time. Throughout the 
1970’s, 1980’s, and the first half of the 1990’s, most jihadi documents stressed the 
treacherous, destructive role played by the near enemy: pro-Western Middle East 
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regimes, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.  Terrorist organizations called for a 
total mobilization and confrontation against jahiliya (lack of Sharia law) society and rule 
in these nations, rather than taking jihad global. Fighting the far enemy—the West and 
the United States—was neither a priority nor a goal for most jihadists. However, in the 
mid-1990’s, a new shift of focus, from localism to globalism, began to take shape among 
some jihadists. This shift occurred because of two critical factors: first, the Afghan War 
and humiliating withdrawal of Russian troops, which planted seeds of transnational jihad 
and emboldened Arab veterans,  and  second, the U.S. involvement in Saudi Arabia after 
the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and stationing of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, which 
inflamed the religious sensibilities of many Saudis, radicals, and bin Laden himself, 
reinforcing the conviction that the United States possessed hegemonic designs on the 
Middle East.  
Therefore, the United States became the first enemy must be destroyed in the bin 
Laden’s list.  Bin Laden used American military presence as a rallying cry and effective 
tool to recruit new members.144 Years ago, bin Laden defined this strategy as a two-
pronged assault on both the “far enemy” (the U.S. and the West) and the “near enemy” 
(those reprobate, authoritarian, anti-Islamic regimes in the Middle East, Central Asia, 
South Asia, and Southeast Asia, against whom the global jihadist movement is 
implacably opposed.)145 
After the 9/11 terror attacks, al-Qaeda adopted a new approach. In order to 
succeed, al-Qaeda described seven phases: Awakening, Opening Eyes, Arising and 
Standing Up, The Downfall of Arab Regimes, Declaration of Caliphate, Total 
Confrontation, and Definite Victory. The aim of the September 11, 2001 suicide attacks 
was to provoke the U.S. into declaring war on the Islamic world—thereby “Awakening” 
and mobilizing the radicals. In phase two, “Opening Eyes,” the terrorists hope to make 
the “Western conspiracy” aware of the “Islamic community” and make their secret 
battalions ready for battle. Phase three, “Arising and Standing Up,” consists of attacks 
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against secular Turkey and archenemy Israel. The downfall of hated Arab regimes, 
including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, will be phase four, “The Downfall of Arab Regimes.” 
Phase five, “Declaration of Caliphate,” will be between 2013 and 2016. At that point, an 
Islamic state, or caliphate, could be declared. After this phase, from 2016 and on, “Total 
Confrontation” between believers and non-believers will occur. The seventh phase is the 
final stage and is described as a “Definite Victory”. This phase should last no longer than 
two years and be completed by 2020. At the end of these phases, al-Qaeda would be able 
to establish an Islamic theocracy by destroying the moderate wing of Islam, destroying 
Israel, and inflicting maximum damage and human suffering on the infidels.146 
The problem with the al-Qaeda strategy is that establishing an Islamic state, or 
“Global Caliphate,” is not an attainable goal since caliphate is not a current concept for 
the Muslims in the world anymore. “Caliphate” was established after the death of the 
prophet Muhammad to govern the country according to the rules of Islam and to unite 
Muslims against enemies. After that, the caliphate became a unifying concept, calling 
Muslim communities to come together against enemies. However, at the end of the 
eighteen century, with the birth and development of national countries, the concept of the 
caliphate began to lose its effectiveness in Muslim communities. At the birth of the 
Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Turkish Parliament denied the 
caliphate concept and terminated it. Therefore, in this century, this concept is outmoded. 
In addition, it will be useful to show individuals that they can live according to 
their religion and beliefs in many secular Muslim-populated countries, such as Turkey. In 
many countries, not only Muslims, but also other minority religious and ethnic groups, 
can perform their religious ceremonies freely. All of these prove that a caliphate is not 
required in order to live according to one’s religious beliefs. This can be accomplished by 
encouraging regimes to found and promote secular institutions that emphasize democracy 
and patriotism.147   
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Another point that must be emphasized about the strategy of al-Qaeda is that it 
does not have the capability to fight against the Western countries and the Unites States 
since it is a terrorist organization. It has neither territory nor a country. It does not have a 
regular army to wage wars. As stated by James Philips, “al-Qaeda is fighting a losing 
battle, that hurts the Muslim community by its ruthless tactics, and that its long term 
goals are unrealistic and even run counter to the interests of most Muslims.” Showing 
these vulnerabilities by psychological operations to individuals will decrease the 
recruitment number since no person wants to die for the sake of an unattainable goal. 
3. Terrorists’ Motivations and Recruitment and Radicalization 
Processes 
In previous chapters, it was discussed that terrorists may have more than one 
reason to perform terrorist acts, such as psychological, economic, political, religious, and 
sociological motivations.148 Martha Crenshaw states that there are at least four categories 
of psychological motivation among jihadist terrorists: (1) the opportunity for action, (2) 
the need to belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) the acquisition of material 
reward.149 Moreover, injustice, identity, and belonging could be perceived as main 
themes in terms of motivation of terrorists.150 These themes are also related to one’s 
potential openness to joining terrorist organizations, or one’s vulnerability. The feeling of 
being important in a social group and need to belong to something are in human nature. 
Therefore, people that have the motivations discussed above are bent for joining a 
terrorist organization. 
Al-Qaeda recruits these kinds of people by promising them social status and 
materialistic reward. For instance, “al-Qaeda incurs costs related to its cell members,  
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such as medical care and family dependency for members killed or imprisoned.”151 These 
kinds of people may join al-Qaeda to guarantee financial support for themselves and their 
families for the rest of their lives.  
Individuals that have the motivations discussed above are exposed to a kind of 
radicalization process, either in their own country or in another country. In the religious 
radicalization process, Mark Sageman notes that the expatriate individuals generally are 
inclined to join terrorist organizations since they feel alienated from the population in 
which they live. Another point is that the global Islamist terrorism social movement is 
based to a great degree on friendship and kinship. The friendship process includes two 
aspects: the first one is the collective decision of a group to join a terrorist organization. 
This refers to the pathway which is a group of people who collectively decide to join a 
terrorist organization. The second one is joining one’s childhood friends who have 
already joined a terrorist organization.152 He describes the radicalization process within 
four stages: the moral outrage of individuals, which refers to the strong motivational 
effects of hearing about or watching suffering fellow Muslims; the moral universe, which 
refers to the idea that there is a war against Islam in the world; resonance with personal 
experiences; and the mobilization by a network, which refers to the guidance of terrorist 
organizations.153 
For the first stage of the radicalization process, childhood and adult experiences 
are very important. People may have weak characters, may have some bad life 
experiences, or may be living in unsatisfying life conditions. In Gerwehr and Daly’s 
article, they mention some of the characteristics as being: “a high level of current distress 
and dissatisfaction, cultural disillusionment in a frustrated seeker, lack of intrinsic 
religious belief system or value system, some disfunctionality in family system and some 
dependent personality tendencies.”154 These are the characteristics of individuals 
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vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist groups. Sayyid Qutb, who is an Islamist and the 
leading intellectual of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and '60s, can be 
regarded as a significant individual who had these vulnerabilities in his character.  
Al-Qaeda is also seeking those people who are likely to become radicalized. 
Richard Reid, known as “the shoe bomber,” is one example of someone recruited by al-
Qaeda. “He attempted to bring down an American Airlines flight in December 2001 by 
detonating explosives hidden in his shoes.” 155 After investigations, it was realized that 
Reid had most of these characteristics. His father had been in prison for years and his 
parents separated in his childhood. “He converted to Islam in prison in his twenties. 
Finally, one could argue that because of his experiences—a life of crime, imprisonment, a 
broken family, and a sense of being part of an out-group because of his mixed race—Reid 
was undergoing severe distress and dissatisfaction.”156 Weak characters and 
impressionable people with problematic childhoods are targets of al-Qaeda for 
recruitment, because it is easy to convince people having these characteristics.   
It could be perceived that the United States’ policy on the Global War on 
Terrorism is mostly targeting Muslims, which attracts their rage. This policy includes the 
United States’ support of Israelis, suffering Iraqis, and the United States’ continued 
presence in Muslim lands. The Muslim population is “motivated by a shared sense of 
enmity and grievance felt towards the United States and West in general and their host-
nations in particular. In this specific instance, however, the relationship with al-Qaeda is 
more inspirational than actual, abetted by profound rage over the U.S. invasion and 
occupation of Iraq and the oppression of Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and 
elsewhere.”157 These suffering people, who have lost their relatives and been exploited 
for years, suppose that there is a war against Islam—the moral universe stage—and may 
become more radicalized in their beliefs and join al-Qaeda in a desperate manner.          
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After being radicalized in their beliefs, individuals need a kind of mobilization—a 
recruitment process—that is provided by terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations 
use different recruitment processes, according to the psychology and vulnerability of 
populations. Although there are a great variety of recruitment processes that might be 
used by terrorist organizations, a review of literature reveals a few common structures for 
al-Qaeda.158 Ultimately, as discussed in chapter II and IV, there are four approaches used 
by al-Qaeda to disseminate their messages to a target population, namely the net 
approach, the funnel approach, the infection approach, and the seed crystal approach. 
While a terrorist organization targets the whole community equally in the net 
approach, the funnel approach is uses an incremental pattern in order to recruit members 
of the population. If the target population is limited in accepting foreign ideas, the 
infection approach is used for recruitment. An agent can be inserted into the targeted 
community to rally potential recruits. Generally, in the seed crystal approach, a targeted 
population is so inaccessible that a trusted agent cannot be inserted into the population. In 
this case, recruiters may seek to provide a context for self-recruitment.159 
Psychological motivations, as mentioned above, include belonging, identity, and 
reward. For joining al-Qaeda, these motivations include the desire for young Muslim men 
to appear religious, to be honorable in the eyes of family and friends, and to engage in 
sanctioned violence.160 People join terrorist organizations to feel that they are important 
and valued, and that they will be rewarded after they die. Nevertheless, in Islam it is 
absolutely forbidden to terrorize and kill an innocent person unless he attacks your life, 
property, and religion. In the Quran, it is stated,  
Whosoever kills an innocent human being, it shall be as if he has killed all 
mankind, and whosoever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had 
saved the life of all mankind”161 and “Invite all to the way of your God 
with wisdom and beautiful preaching. And argue with them in ways that 
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are best and most gracious. For your God knows best who have strayed 
from his path and who receive guidance. And if you do respond to an 
attack, respond no worse than they did. But if you show patience, that is 
indeed the best course. Be patient—for your patience is from God. Indeed, 
God is with those who restrain themselves and those who do good.162  
Moreover, Islam also forbids committing suicide. It is believed that an individual 
that commits suicide will be burned in the flames of hell forever and will never be 
forgiven, since Allah is the only one who has the authority to give and take lives. 
Terrorist motivations and al-Qaeda radicalization and recruitment processes also 
have many vulnerabilities that can be exploited in psychological operations. These 
vulnerabilities can also be regarded as the barriers that prevent individuals from joining 
al-Qaeda, and be categorized as familial, economic, social/societal, and psychological. 
These barriers embody the notion of what strategists call “loving life too much.”163 These 
barriers can be emphasized in psychological operations products.  
The first barrier, the familial barrier, is the pull of family. Most al-Qaeda 
members are married and have more than one child. The radicalized individual hesitates 
to join a terrorist organization and travel to other parts of the world, where wars are 
waged, since they believe that their families and children will be undergoing financial 
hardships and be miserable in the future. Even single individuals seek their families’ 
permission, and sometimes have to fight against strong parental disapproval. They may 
back down their decision about traveling to other countries. Therefore, most members 
break contact with their families and friends after getting into a jihad. It is also known 
that terrorist cell members who maintain contact with friends and family outside are more 
likely to withdraw. Portrayals of miserable families and friends can be used as major 
themes in psychological operations products.  
Another barrier is economic, for individuals who desire a comfortable life and 
Western materialistic culture. In Western countries, many individuals have a high 
standard of living. These individuals have to give up their jobs and opportunities to 
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pursue a jihad. In addition, many foot soldiers’ financial status could be at an economic 
extreme and they cannot afford their personal expenses and also to travel for a jihad. Al-
Qaeda does not pay the expenses of these members. For example, L’Houssaine 
Khertchou, a Moroccan al-Qaeda member, joined the organization in 1991 and trained to 
serve as bin Laden’s personal pilot. He defected from al-Qaeda since he became bitter 
after one of bin Laden’s aides turned down his request for $500 to cover the costs of his 
wife’s cesarean section.164 Reasons like this make many foot soldiers hesitant to join the 
jihad caravan. Exploiting this financial situation may be useful for the products of 
psychological operations.  
Another type of barrier, the psychological, is the most important in terms 
psychological operations, and is unique to the foot soldiers of an organization. This 
psychological barrier includes the concept of wahn, which refers to the love of life, 
children, and property, and fear of death, torment, pain, and martyrdom.  
The last type of barrier is social and societal barrier, which refers to the 
perception of being at disadvantage. In this barrier, the West disseminates messages 
claiming that terrorists are at disadvantage to population. These barriers are between the 
individual and the society, which makes it easier to overcome. Therefore, the strategists 
already have established a counter argument to the messages from the West, such as 
Islamic religious reformation, self redemption, and anti-western views, to counter them. 
These themes can also be used in psychological operations to influence foot soldiers. 
4. Organizational Structure and Leaders  
Examination of al-Qaeda structure and its leader cadre may reveal numerous 
vulnerabilities that can be used in information operations. Al-Qaeda’s organizational and 
operational infrastructure is different from other guerilla or terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda’s 
infrastructure has proved very difficult to detect and combat since it is embedded in 
diverse populations. Al-Qaeda is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it 
comprises a core base in Afghanistan and other largely independent terrorist groups that 
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it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities. Al-Qaeda leaders serve as an 
integral part of the high command for their organization.165 Since it was founded, al-
Qaeda has been led by charismatic leaders. Because of these leaders, al-Qaeda has 
survived. They developed an emotional attachment with their followers. They focused the 
organization on a specific cause, the establishment of Islamic State or Global Caliphate, 
which drove the followers to act beyond what they would in general social contexts.166 
In order to carry out effective psychological operations, leaders of al-Qaeda, such 
as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, must be investigated, and the 
vulnerabilities that can be obtained from these investigations must be used in 
psychological operations. Leaders must be discredited in every possible way. The 
messages should focus on undermining the stature of their leadership. The wrongness in 
their characters and their failures must be shown.  For instance, even though Osama bin 
Laden did not obtain any kind of religious education, he issued many fatwa (Islamic 
religious edicts), to call Muslims to jihad. However, in Islam, only individuals who have 
religious education are permitted to issue a fatwa.  
There are many tactical and operational differences between the individual leaders 
of al-Qaeda, which may play a significant role in terrorist disillusionment and its use in 
psychological operations. For example, Essam al-Ridi, one of defectors of al-Qaeda, 
asserted that during the battles against Soviets in Afghanistan, he was offended by 
battlefield orders from bin Laden and other leaders, who lacked military experience. 
These kinds of differences among leaders may be emphasized to influence a member to 
defect from the organization. Another example may include publicizing a video 
demonstrating, for example, that one of the leaders is not skillful in handling a firearm, 
which may make members uncomfortable about taking orders from this person.167 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The Global War on Terror is a protracted war. In order to defeat terrorist 
organizations in this war, the psychological aspect of war, in addition to the conventional 
aspect, must be comprehended by world officials, since many terrorist organizations have 
the support of the population. Al-Qaeda also has a great support of radical Muslim 
communities. In order to destroy al-Qaeda, this support must be severed. Implementing 
effective information operations will be helpful in defeating al-Qaeda. However, in order 
to carry out effective psychological operations, vulnerabilities of al-Qaeda must be 
determined. Analysis of al-Qaeda’s ideology, strategy, members’ motivation, 
radicalization and recruitment processes, and organizational structure would reveal 
numerous vulnerabilities that can be used in implementing effective information 
operations. The killing of innocent people, the false interpretations of jihad concepts, and 
the unattainable global caliphate objective are some of the vulnerabilities of al-Qaeda. By 
making use of these vulnerabilities and presenting these vulnerabilities to target 
populations via suitable means and individuals, the United States and other countries that 
suffer from terrorism may influence individuals not to join al-Qaeda, or to defect from 
the terrorist organization. Then, in the long run, al-Qaeda would be defeated.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon to the world, yet it remains difficult to define 
and to counter. Terrorism has been explained in various ways, from the political level to 
the psychological level. Countering terrorism and terrorist organizations requires several 
measures that must be taken at the same time. Most countries’ counterterrorism strategies 
in the world are focused on killing, capturing, or deterring terrorists. The success of these 
strategies is measured with the numbers of killed or captured terrorists. However, 
instances of terrorism have proved that military sanctions alone are not adequate and 
efficient enough to destroy terrorism. Counterterrorism strategies should also focus on 
nonlethal measures, such as economic, political, and social measures. The psychological 
dimensions of terrorism must be understood, evaluated, and used in countering terrorism.  
There is no universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism, which makes it 
difficult to develop counterterrorism strategies. However, examinations of a terrorist 
organization as a system help us to understand the mechanisms of how it works and 
develop counter-strategies. As an open system, a terrorist organization requires inputs—
recruits, money, weapons, etc.—and converts these inputs to outputs—attacks, sabotage, 
assassinations, etc. Countering terrorist organizations requires the prevention of inputs, 
such as new recruits. Other strategies should include measures to reduce outputs by 
influencing the foot soldiers of a terrorist organization.  
In this regard, the nature of terrorist organizations and individual terrorists, such 
as their motivations, beliefs, and ideologies, must be completely understood, and the 
connection between a terrorist organization and its target population, by whom they are 
supported, must be defined and severed. Psychological operations, as nonlethal military 
operations, can be used to influence members of a population not to join a terrorist 
organization, thereby severing their support and manipulating the foot soldiers of the 
terrorist organization to stop their attacks.  
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Psychological operations are planned operations that convey selected information 
and indicators to foreign target audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 
and individuals.168 Psychological operations decrease the motivation and combat 
efficiency of an enemy and cause dissidence and disaffection within the enemy’s ranks. 
Moreover, psychological operations may create resistance against a hostile regime or a 
terrorist organization within a population.  
Terrorism may also refer to a species of psychological warfare waged by terrorists 
through the media. In time, it is understood that the war against terrorism will not be won 
with bombs and missiles. The way to counter psychological warfare must be with 
psychological warfare; thus, psychological operations must be the primary weapon in 
counterterrorism. In this regard, psychological operations can be used as nonlethal 
military operations with the employment of social, economic, and political sanctions over 
a population who are favorable to terrorists, or the foot soldiers of a terrorist organization. 
Psychological operations can be used to deter terrorists, disrupt and destroy terrorist 
organizations’ activities, and influence the population to sever the support given to the 
terrorist organization. In terms of countering terrorism, the population and the foot 
soldiers of a terrorist organization become the target audiences. The media and the 
Internet, via social leaders, can be used as effective communication channels.  
In a terrorist organization, psychological operations may inject internal mistrust 
amongst members, cause internal power struggles, and cause inter-group conflicts, as 
well as major disagreements about tactics and techniques. Countering terrorism requires 
two major elements for psychological operations program. These are: 
• Inhibiting potential terrorists from joining terrorist groups 
• Producing dissension within groups, reducing support for groups and their 
leaders, and facilitating exit from groups.169 
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Psychological operations products, messages, and themes must contain 
appropriate context, which requires a complete understanding of the target audience. In 
other words, psychological operations require special intelligence about target audiences, 
which is different from conventional intelligence.  
As is known, intelligence drives operations. Without proper intelligence, 
operations cannot be properly planned or successfully executed. Decision-makers need 
intelligence to judge an adversary’s course of action, understand the battlefield, and 
determine their own course of action. As well as in other military operations, 
psychological operations also require intelligence of the enemy. The relationship between 
intelligence and psychological operations must be close and continuous since 
psychological operations requires timely, accurate, and most importantly, relevant 
intelligence about the enemy. Without proper intelligence, an entire psychological 
operations campaign could be directed toward the wrong audience or could produce 
undesirable consequences.  
The intelligence requirements for psychological operations are significantly 
different from those of conventional operations. Conventional units need intelligence 
about adversaries’ forces, numbers, order of battle, weapons systems, and course of 
action; however, psychological operations units need information concerning the 
perceptions, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, sensitivities, and patterns of rational and non-
rational behavior of adversaries.170 In addition, the collection method of these 
requirements also differs from the operational intelligence requirements. Intelligence for 
psychological operations can best be obtained through human intelligence and open 
intelligence sources, such as newspapers, magazines, books, academic journals, and 
foreign broadcasts. 
Intelligence requirements for psychological operations products fall into three 
broad and overlapping categories: target audience determination and analysis, theme 
development, and product dissemination.171  
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Target audience analysis includes defining the key issues, concerns, and themes 
of target audience; in short, identifying potential vulnerabilities. Considering that the 
target audiences of psychological operations for countering terrorism are the population 
and foot soldiers of the terrorist organization, cultural intelligence helps us to properly 
focus on the vulnerabilities of the target audiences. In addition, examining broadly and in 
detail properties of populations, such as their history, political system, political economy, 
and so forth, will be useful for developing psychological operations plans, programs, and 
products that will influence the target audience.  
In order to compose an effective message to the target audience, terrorist 
organizations must be examined in detail, both structurally and ideologically. Examining 
terrorist organizations helps to identify their vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, which 
form the intelligence requirements for theme development, will be the major theme and 
subject of psychological operations products. These requirements can be obtained 
through examination of terrorist motivations; terrorist organizations’ radicalization, 
recruitment, and conversion processes; ideology, goals, and strategies; and general 
structure.  
The intelligence requirements for product dissemination include examination of 
the means and timing for disseminating the psychological operations’ products. Which 
means can be used and how much a target population has access to products become the 
major issues.  
The war on terrorism is prolonged war. In order to defeat terrorist organizations in 
this war, the psychological aspects of war, as well as the lethal aspects, must be 
understood by world officials. Populations, which are the center of gravity, must be 
convinced. Al-Qaeda is also cognizant of this fact and has a great network of support of 
radical Muslim communities. In order to win the Global War on Terrorism, as a first 
stage, al-Qaeda, which is the most famous terrorist organization, must be destroyed. In 
order to destroy al-Qaeda, their support must be severed by preventing new recruits from 
the population and facilitating exits from the organization.  Implementing effective 
psychological operations may be helpful in achieving this objective. However, in order to 
carry out effective psychological operations, the vulnerabilities of al-Qaeda must be 
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determined. The analysis of al-Qaeda’s ideology, strategy, members’ motivation, 
radicalization and recruitment processes, and organizational structure would reveal 
numerous vulnerabilities that can be used in implementing effective information 
operations. The killing of innocent people, the false interpretations of the concept of 
jihad, and the unattainable objective of the global caliphate are some of the vulnerabilities 
of al-Qaeda. By making use of these vulnerabilities, the United States and other countries 
that suffer from terrorism may influence individuals not to join al-Qaeda or to defect 
from the terrorist organization. This examination process can also be applied to other 
terrorist organizations, and their vulnerabilities can be obtained through this examination. 
Therefore, al-Qaeda, in the short run, and terrorism, in the long run, would both be 
defeated.  
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